“…Satel and Lillienfeld [ 4 ] point out that before we can decide whether addiction is a brain disease, we must first decide whether it constitutes a disease in the first place. They note that there is very little consensus in psychiatry, and in other domains of medicine, about what constitutes a disease, and they doubt that this issue can be solved scientifically, as Lewis tries, by reinterpreting neuroscientific data (this objection is shared by Wakefield [ 5 ], as well as Henden & Gjelsvik [ 6 ]). Satel and Lillienfeld think that engaging in this classification debate is potentially fruitless and that the rational response is to develop an understanding of addiction that underscores the way a range of complex behaviours can be analysed in different dimensions ‘…ranging from molecular function and structure and brain physiology to psychology, psychosocial environment, and social and cultural relations.’ The issue of the status of addiction thus cannot avoid questions of normativity that feature in those domains.…”