What is wrong with conspiracy beliefs?

Abstract

The majority of psychological research highlights the role of lapses in rational thinking as a significant contributing factor to conspiracy beliefs (CBs). However, historical examples demonstrate that not all CBs are inherently incorrect. In this paper, we propose a more nuanced approach, suggesting that instead of universally labelling CBs as false or adopting an agnostic stance towards their veracity, it is beneficial to assess the plausibility of each CB individually along a continuum. To achieve this, we recommend utilizing two key indicators: (1) the prior probability of a specific conspiracy theory being true, considered independently of any supporting or contradicting evidence, and (2) the extent to which proponents of a CB demonstrate actively open-minded thinking. We delve into the rationale behind employing such a nuanced approach to evaluating CB plausibility and present several strategies for calculating and integrating plausibility ratings within conspiracy research. Consistent with our proposed framework, we argue that conspiracy researchers possess both the capability and responsibility to differentiate certain CBs as comparatively more irrational than others, provided that such differentiation is based on principled and probabilistic grounds.

Perceived Corruption is a Robust Associate of Conspiracy, Paranormal, and Pseudoscience Beliefs

“…In other words, while individual factors significantly influence beliefs in conspiracy theories, as past research demonstrated (e.g., Douglas et al, 2017), their plausilibity should also be examined depending on the context (Alper & Yilmaz, 2023). In societies where institutional trust is low and corruption is high, individuals who perceive institutions as lacking transparency may distrust official statements.…”

On Different Operationalizations and Conceptualizations of the Tendency to Believe in Conspiracy Theories

“…After all, the public might not be concerned about individuals expressing rational concern about their government but worry more about individuals whose actions are based on perceptions that are scientifically unwarranted and not shared by the broader population (Sutton & Douglas, 2020), such as the idea of governments and scientists being involved in a scheme to convince individuals that the world is round while it is indeed flat or that the US government faked the Apollo moon landing. While it might be possible to distinguish reasonable doubt from scientifically unwarranted theories on a theoretical level (see Alper & Yilmaz, 2023; Brotherton, 2013; Nera & Schöpfer, 2023, for attempts to do so), the question remains on how to operationalize these scientifically unwarranted theories. The fact that belief in such theories is often correlated (e.g., Swami et al, 2017; Wood et al, 2012) has led scientists to use scales consisting of several such scientifically unwarranted theories, as for example in the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al, 2010).…”

“Just Because It’s a Conspiracy Theory Doesn’t Mean They’re Not Out to Get You”: Differentiating the Correlates of Judgments of Plausible Versus Implausible Conspiracy Theories

“…Although core definitions of conspiracy theories do not inherently refer to their level of verisimilitude, psychological research has primarily focused on the irrational and epistemically problematic aspects of conspiracy theories (Alper & Yilmaz, 2023).…”