What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?

Glaser, Charles L.; Kaufmann, Chaim

doi:10.2307/2539240

Cited by 70 publications

(50 citation statements)

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“…Terlebih lagi, dalam menghadapi ancaman nuklir dari Korea Utara, Jepang ingin mencegah serta menghentikan percobaan nuklir dari Korea Utara dimana hal ini dianggap telah melanggar batas territori Jepang (Cook, 2014 (Glaser & Kauffman, 1998, hal. 45 Teori offense-defense menawarkan sebuah pandangan baru dalam politik internasional yang didasari pada argumen bahwa, perang dapat dicegah ketika defense mendapatkan keuntungan atas offense dalam skema offense-defense balance (Glaser & Kauffman, 1998). Van Evera (1998, hal.…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Analisis Teori Offense-Defense Pada Reformasi Kebijakan Pertahanan Jepang Dalam Dinamika Keamanan Di Asia Timur

Alghifari¹,

Letticia²

2016

JPI

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Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Analisis Teori Offense-Defense Pada Reformasi Kebijakan Pertahanan Jepang Dalam Dinamika Keamanan Di Asia Timur

Alghifari¹,

Letticia²

2016

JPI

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“…The assumption instead is that "within reasonable limits of analysis, states make the best possible decisions for attack or defense, taking into account their own and their opponents' options for strategy and force posture." 26 …”

Section: Literature Review: Preponderance Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Wearing Away the Stone: Assessing Theories of Combat Attrition

Clark

2013

Comparative Strategy

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“…Third, students are exposed to major nuclear dilemmas in their simulations. For example, it can highlight the challenge of matching nuclear and conventional strategies in overcoming the stability-instability paradox, whether missile defense provides an offensive or defensive incentive for nuclear attack (Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998;Levy, 1984), and the benefits and drawbacks of conducting decapitation attacks. …”

Section: The Simulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling Choices in Nuclear Warfighting

Schofield

2012

Simulation & Gaming

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Two classroom simulations-SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION and MULTIPOLAR ASIAN SIMULATION-are used to teach and test various aspects of the Borden versus Brodie debate on the Schelling versus Lanchester approach to nuclear conflict modeling and resolution. The author applies a Schelling test to segregate high from low empathic students, and assigns them to hard case positions in three simulations to test whether high empathy students can engage in tactic bargaining and whether low empathetic students are necessarily as escalation prone. He has a bipolar nuclear simulation that is an easy case for the Brodie set of assumptions about nuclear war, avoidance, and Schelling-esque tacit bargaining. He expects the system structure and high empathy leader selection to contain escalation, despite the temptation of relying on accelerated Single Integrated Operational Plan solutions and the counterincentive of diminished tacit bargaining through decapitation attacks. The second simulation is a multipolar nuclear simulation set in the near future of Asia, and emulates the Borden-esque logic of nuclear war as artillery exchanges, with a Lanchester square law logic encouraging rapid escalation, coupled with a selection for the most autistic leadership. The author expects rapid nuclear escalation under these structural and decision-making conditions. His conclusions are anecdotal, but seem to indicate, from student feedback during class discussions, that the failure to model fear may be a factor in undermining successful tacit bargaining by players, suggesting that Borden rather than Brodie better conceptualized nuclear conflict. Therefore, peace is about restraining war initiation, as there are great pressures for escalation once war is initiated.How would NATO employ nuclear weapons in the event of war? Two contrasting approaches, the slow escalation versus massive retaliation, each with their own rationales and intellectual and political proponents, have received the most theoretical attention. Classroom simulations, both to teach and test the competing hypotheses of their alternative approaches, have generally shown that after initial attempts at tacit bargaining fail, players will resort to massive retaliation. About 20 seminar students are assigned positions based on an empathy test to create most likely outcome conditions for two simulations, or tests, of these contrasting approaches. The findings suggest that under the best of circumstances, escalation is notoriously difficult to control. States should be very careful about initiating conflicts and then assuming that nuclear deterrence will hold up as well within in-war situations. If state decision makers are aware of this, then they will be reluctant to begin using nuclear weapons, and nuclear deterrence is therefore robust and peace enhancing.The simulations are also for the purposes of dynamic and interactive classroom teaching of three topics. First, students are taught two methods of warfighting, and then asked to choose between them and apply their choice in a simulatio...

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What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?

Cited by 70 publications

References 1 publication

Analisis Teori Offense-Defense Pada Reformasi Kebijakan Pertahanan Jepang Dalam Dinamika Keamanan Di Asia Timur

Analisis Teori Offense-Defense Pada Reformasi Kebijakan Pertahanan Jepang Dalam Dinamika Keamanan Di Asia Timur

Wearing Away the Stone: Assessing Theories of Combat Attrition

Modeling Choices in Nuclear Warfighting

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