2022
DOI: 10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_1
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

What Is “The Evolution of Cooperation“?

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
0
0

Year Published

2023
2023
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
1

Relationship

0
1

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 1 publication
(1 citation statement)
references
References 52 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Originally coined by Maynard Smith and Price, the term evolutionarily stable strategy has been adopted by a broad range of disciplines across the spectrum of natural and social sciences (Piel, 2019(Piel, , 2020Leimar and McNamara, 2023). ESS, a subset of Nash equilibrium (NE; Apaloo et al, 2015), states that if a population adopts a strategy in a given environment, it cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy that is initially very rare (Nakamaru, 2023, Chapter 1). As described by Bishop and Cannings (1976), in a population where most individuals use a strategy p against a mutant strategy q, ∀ q, q ≠ p, for p to be an ESS, for every possible q, a) the average pay-off, in terms of inclusive fitness, the ultimate utility (Levin and Grafen, 2019), of using strategy p against itself is greater than the pay-off of q against p, E(p, p) > E(q, p); or b) If the pay-off of p against p is equal to the pay-off of q against p, i.e., E(p, p) = E(q, p), then p must have a higher pay-off against q than q does against itself, E(p, q) > E(q, q).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Originally coined by Maynard Smith and Price, the term evolutionarily stable strategy has been adopted by a broad range of disciplines across the spectrum of natural and social sciences (Piel, 2019(Piel, , 2020Leimar and McNamara, 2023). ESS, a subset of Nash equilibrium (NE; Apaloo et al, 2015), states that if a population adopts a strategy in a given environment, it cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy that is initially very rare (Nakamaru, 2023, Chapter 1). As described by Bishop and Cannings (1976), in a population where most individuals use a strategy p against a mutant strategy q, ∀ q, q ≠ p, for p to be an ESS, for every possible q, a) the average pay-off, in terms of inclusive fitness, the ultimate utility (Levin and Grafen, 2019), of using strategy p against itself is greater than the pay-off of q against p, E(p, p) > E(q, p); or b) If the pay-off of p against p is equal to the pay-off of q against p, i.e., E(p, p) = E(q, p), then p must have a higher pay-off against q than q does against itself, E(p, q) > E(q, q).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%