What Is the Concept of Computation?

Sieg, Wilfried

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-94418-0_39

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…However, Post's work can be completely subsumed under the conceptual approach of the Turing-Gandy-Sieg explications (cf. Sieg 2018). Even though Post does not specify a semi-formal notion of computability, his work seems to implicitly make use of the notion of computorability.…”

Section: Foundational Analyses Of Computability As Three-step Explicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explication as a Three-Step Procedure: the case of the Church-Turing Thesis

Benedetto

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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In recent years two different axiomatic characterizations of the intuitive concept of effective calculability have been proposed, one by Sieg and the other by Dershowitz and Gurevich. Analyzing them from the perspective of Carnapian explication, I argue that these two characterizations explicate the intuitive notion of effective calculability in two different ways. I will trace back these two ways to Turing’s and Kolmogorov’s informal analyses of the intuitive notion of calculability and to their respective outputs: the notion of computorability and the notion of algorithmability. I will then argue that, in order to adequately capture the conceptual differences between these two notions, the classical two-step picture of explication is not enough. I will present a more fine-grained three-step version of Carnapian explication, showing how with its help the difference between these two notions can be better understood and explained.

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Section: Foundational Analyses Of Computability As Three-step Explicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explication as a Three-Step Procedure: the case of the Church-Turing Thesis

Benedetto

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…More specifically, we will first argue that the concept of algorithm exhibits a certain degree of open texture even in its original scientific context, as the many ongoing foundational discussions on the nature and the scope of the notion of algorithm, and on the closely related notion of computation, in the philosophy and theory of computing arguably show (e.g. Shapiro 2006b;Gurevich 2014;Dean 2016;Sieg 2018;Primiero 2020). Then, we will argue that, on top of this original open texture of the concept of algorithm, the use of this concept in the legal discourse exhibits an additional layer of semantic indeterminacy due to the essential open texture of legal discourse.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The open texture of ‘algorithm’ in legal language

Baldini,

De Benedetto

2024

AI & Soc

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In this paper, we will survey the different uses of the term algorithm in contemporary legal practice. We will argue that the concept of algorithm currently exhibits a substantial degree of open texture, co-determined by the open texture of the concept of algorithm itself and by the open texture inherent to legal discourse. We will substantiate our argument by virtue of a case study, in which we analyze a recent jurisprudential case where the first and second-degree judges have carved-out contrasting notions of algorithm. We will see that, thanks to our analysis of the open texture of the notion of algorithm in legal language, we can make sense of the different decisions taken by the judges as different contextually-determined sharpenings of the concept of algorithm. Finally, we will draw some general conclusions concerning the use of technical terms in legal instruments that address new technologies, such as the EU AI Act.

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Proofs as Objects

Sieg

2022

Axiomatic Thinking I

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What Is the Concept of Computation?

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Explication as a Three-Step Procedure: the case of the Church-Turing Thesis

Explication as a Three-Step Procedure: the case of the Church-Turing Thesis

The open texture of ‘algorithm’ in legal language

Proofs as Objects

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