What is the best way to prove a cryptographic protocol correct?

Malladi, Sreekanth; Hura, Gurdeep S.

doi:10.1109/ipdps.2008.4536556

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…A type-flaw attack is possible on this protocol even in the presence of component numbering (originally presented in [33]): i is the identity of the intruder or attacker; i(x) denotes i spoofing as x. We use lowercase now for agent identities and nonces (a, b, n a , n b ), since this is a trace of the protocol execution, not the protocol specification.…”

Section: Tagging Prevents Type-flaw Attacks Under Xor: Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

“…If m 1 ∈ Constants(S 1 ), again from BSCA, t 1 cannot belong to Vars, and it must be a constant. If m 1 is a fresh constant of S 1 , then t 1 must also belong to S 1 from Assumption 6 (freshness) and (33), and if m 1 is not fresh, t 1 could belong to either SubTerms(S 1 ) or IIK from Assumption 5. Further, θ = {}.…”

Section: µ-Nut Prevents Multi-protocol Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on cryptographic protocols under Exclusive-OR

Malladi

2010

Preprint

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Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks are notorious threats to cryptographic protocol security. They are arguably the most commonly reported attacks on protocols. For nearly fifteen years, researchers have continuously emphasized the importance of preventing these attacks.In their classical works, Heather et al. and Guttman et al. proved that these could be prevented by tagging encrypted messages with distinct constants, in a standard protocol model with a free message algebra [23,21].However, most "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0 are designed with the Exclusive-OR (XOR) operator that possesses algebraic properties, breaking the free algebra assumption. These algebraic properties induce equational theories that need to be considered when analyzing protocols that use the operator. This is the problem we consider in this paper: We prove that, under certain assumptions, tagging encrypted components still prevents type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks even in the presence of the XOR operator and its algebraic properties.

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Section: Tagging Prevents Type-flaw Attacks Under Xor: Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: µ-Nut Prevents Multi-protocol Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on cryptographic protocols under Exclusive-OR

Malladi

2010

Preprint

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“…(A and B are agent variables; N A , N B are nonce variables; [X] → Y represents X encrypted with Y using an asymmetric encryption algorithm.). A type-flaw attack is possible on this protocol even in the presence of component numbering (recently presented in [10]):…”

Section: Tagging Prevents Type-flaw Attacks Under Xor -Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties

Malladi,

Lafourcade

2010

Preprint

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Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system.In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption.

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What is the best way to prove a cryptographic protocol correct?

Cited by 2 publications

References 16 publications

How to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on cryptographic protocols under Exclusive-OR

How to prevent type-flaw and multi-protocol attacks on cryptographic protocols under Exclusive-OR

How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties

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