What Is the Benacerraf Problem?

Clarke‐Doane, Justin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45980-6_2

Cited by 38 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…As many authors have pointed out, these strong conclusions do not follow: beliefs may be justified even if we can't explain their reliability, and we may psychologically hold onto such beliefs even if we know we cannot explain their reliability (for relevant discussion, see Enoch ; Setiya , chap. 2; Clarke‐Doane ; Tersman ). But the force of Field's Nepalese village analogy does not depend on these overly strong conclusions.…”

Section: The Generalized Integration Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Schroeter

2017

Nous

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The Generalized Integration Challenge (GIC) is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which (GIC) seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be (i) mind‐independent and (ii) causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge impossible. We suggest that bringing metasemantics into play can help to resolve this puzzle. We propose an independently plausible metasemantic constraint on reference determination and show how it can provide a plausible response to (GIC) for this brand of normative realism.

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Section: The Generalized Integration Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Focusing on subjects’ reliability about the instantiation of properties helps sidestep a puzzle highlighted by Justin Clarke‐Doane (; ). Clarke‐Doane focuses on the reliability of beliefs about necessary moral truths such as ‘torturing toddlers for fun is morally wrong’.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Schroeter

2017

Nous

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“…See Clarke‐Doane (). Clarke‐Doane's view is a sophisticated version of an idea that is sometimes attributed to Lewis (), pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?

Schechter

2018

Philosophical Issues

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“…If believing P is a defeasible reason for S to believe Q, M * is an undercutting defeater for this reason if and only if M * is a defeater (for believing P as a reason for S to believe Q) and M * is a reason for S to doubt or deny that P would not be true unless Q were true" (Pollock 1986: 196). 7 Cf. Lewis: "[I]f it is a necessary truth that so-and-so, then believing that so-and-so is an infallible method of being right.…”

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confidence: 99%

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

Jonas

2016

Philos Stud

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I argue that recent attempts to deflect Access Problems for realism about a priori domains such as mathematics, logic, morality, and modality using arguments from evolution result in two kinds of explanatory overkill: (1) the Access Problem is eliminated for contentious domains, and (2) realist belief becomes viciously immune to arguments from dispensability, and to non-rebutting counter-arguments more generally. Access ProblemsLet D be a domain of a priori truths. The Access Problem (also known as the Reliability Challenge) for realism about D consists in the apparent impossibility of explaining how knowledge of the D-truths is possible, if these truths are understood realistically (i.e. as objectively/ response-independently/ robustly true). Formulated as a question: How could it be anything but a fluke that our D-beliefs reliably match the D-truths? Failure to provide an explanation suitable to bridge this gap between the D-truths and the subject holding Dbeliefs has been argued to undermine realist belief in the D-truths.2 Domains supposedly affected by Access Problems are:Mathematics: The Access Problem for the domain of mathematics is also known as the Benacerraf-Field Challenge. Benacerraf points out that "If...numbers are the kinds of entities they are normally taken to be [namely, mind-independent abstract objects], then the connection between the truth conditions for the statements of number theory and any relevant events connected with the people who are supposed to have mathematical knowledge cannot be made out" (1973: 673). Field clarifies: "Benacerraf's challenge...is to provide an account of the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well reflect the facts about them...The idea is that if it appears in principle impossible to explain this, 1 Many thanks to Ana Bajzelj, Claire Benn, Sharon Berry, Meir Buzaglo, Elvira DiBona, Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch, Peter Gerdes, Sharon Krishek, Arnon Levy, Ittay NissanRozen, Olla Solomyak, Ruth Weintraub, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments and discussions.2 The Access Problem is a problem for realism specifically. As such, it is not identical to the more general epistemic problem of justification: a theory of justification (for example coherentism) can explain how our beliefs are justified, yet fail to eliminate the Access Problem.

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What Is the Benacerraf Problem?

Cited by 38 publications

References 48 publications

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics

Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

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