What is Speciesism?

Horta, Óscar

doi:10.1007/s10806-009-9205-2

Cited by 121 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…With age, however, the distinction between the moral standing of humans versus nonhumans increases, whereas the distinction between pets and food animals decreases. Further research is required to uncover what is driving these changes, but beyond the potential impact of biological changes, such as the association between abstract thinking and reasoning and the pre-frontal cortex [ 34 , 35 ], one possibility is that with age children increasingly learn to regard humans as ‘special’ and nonhuman animals as a homogenous ‘other’ [ 36 – 38 ]. Concurrently, the acknowledgement of mental capacities in both pets and food animals [ 39 ] may begin to blur the distinction between these groups, thereby reducing the discrepancy in perceived moral worth.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

et al. 2018

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Prominent theorists have made the argument that modern humans express moral concern for a greater number of entities than at any other time in our past. Moreover, adults show stable patterns in the degrees of concern they afford certain entities over others, yet it remains unknown when and how these patterns of moral decision-making manifest in development. Children aged 4 to 10 years (N = 151) placed 24 pictures of human, animal, and environmental entities on a stratified circle representing three levels of moral concern. Although younger and older children expressed similar overall levels of moral concern, older children demonstrated a more graded understanding of concern by including more entities within the outer reaches of their moral circles (i.e., they were less likely to view moral inclusion as a simple in vs. out binary decision). With age children extended greater concern to humans than other forms of life, and more concern to vulnerable groups, such as the sick and disabled. Notably, children’s level of concern for human entities predicted their prosocial behavior. The current research provides novel insights into the development of our moral reasoning and its structure within childhood.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

et al. 2018

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“…4 In addition, there is another argument supporting wide definitions that can be more important in practice. This argument points out that the way speciesism is understood should match the way discriminations against humans HORTA AND ALBERSMEIER -5 of 9 are, and that the latter are usually understood in a wide way (Horta, 2010). Most people today accept it is sexist to favor men over women based on the claim that the former have higher cognitive capacities than the latter.…”

Section: Wide and Narrow Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining speciesism

Horta

Albersmeier

2020

Philosophy Compass

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The term "speciesism" has played a key role in debates about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals, yet little work has been dedicated to clarifying its meaning. Consequently, the concept remains poorly understood and is often employed in ways that might display a speciesist bias themselves. To address this problem, this article develops a definition of speciesism in terms of discrimination and argues in favor of its advantages over alternative accounts. After discussing the key desiderata for a definition of discrimination in general and speciesism in particular, a wide and evaluative account of speciesism is presented. According to it, speciesism is unjustified consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. The article then discusses rival accounts, namely narrow and descriptive definitions of speciesism. The article argues that such accounts are problematic as they overly restrict the scope of phenomena that can be identified as speciesist and disrupt the continuity with other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. 1 | INTRODUCTION The term "speciesism" was coined in 1970 by Ryder (2010 [1970]) to name a form of discrimination favoring those who belong to a certain species (or group of species) against other individuals. It is akin to similar terms naming other forms of discrimination, such as sexism and racism. Since its introduction, it has played a key role in debates about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals. However, and even though half a century has passed since then, this concept remains very poorly understood. There is no single common usage of the term. Both philosophers and animal advocates have used it in different ways. What is more worrying, very little work has been carried out to date on clarifying its meaning. In most cases, the concept has been used without paying much attention to this task and often in ways that have been biased against taking the concept seriously.

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“…There are various definitions of speciesism in circulation in the academic literature (contrast [1,2,7]) and beyond. Some authors treat speciesism as an unjustified position by definition [8]. This is problematic, however, since the defensibility of speciesism is subject to substantive debate [9].…”

Section: Singer's Anti-speciesist Position: a Defencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

Hopster

2019

Animals

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Simple Summary: An influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one's own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled 'speciesism', in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue 'Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy'.Abstract: This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant ('species-relativism'). Third, if we adopt Singer's definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions-the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests-is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant."Our inclination to treat humans as though we are special is no mere prejudice. Despite what Singer says, there is a significant philosophical view at work here-one worthy of careful further investigation." Shelly Kagan [1] (p. 20)"At the end of the day, no clear consensus has emerged-or, at best, this one: no rejoinder to Singer's attack on speciesism has convinced many besides its author, and the challenge remains." François Jaquet [2] (p. 2)

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What is Speciesism?

Cited by 121 publications

References 26 publications

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

The developmental origins of moral concern: An examination of moral boundary decision making throughout childhood

Defining speciesism

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances

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