What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience

Allen, Keith; Quinlan, Philip T.; Andow, James; Fischer, Eugen

doi:10.1111/mila.12370

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 33 publications

(42 reference statements)

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“…The extent to which this phenomenological basis can provide outputs with default epistemic status requires empirical investigation into phenomenological judgments about experience (cf. Allen et al, 2022). The success or otherwise of the phenomenological response is a matter for further empirical investigation, but this new topic lies beyond the scope of the present paper.…”

Section: Philosophical Consequences: the 'Fragmentation Challenge' An...mentioning

confidence: 89%

Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision

2023

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Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of the phenomenon of interest. Debates about the nature of perception tend to take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, consistent with Direct Realism. This conception is often accorded an epistemic default status. We draw on philosophical and psychological literature on naïve theories and belief fragmentation to motivate the hypothesis that untutored common sense encompasses conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions: there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy epistemic default status. To examine this hypothesis, a survey administered an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli to lay participants. We found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs about vision. Against common assumptions, Direct Realist beliefs are not clearly dominant, and consistent adherence to Direct Realism is not the norm, but the exception. These findings are consistent with recent accounts of belief fragmentation. They forcefully challenge common methodology in philosophical debates about the nature of perception and beyond.

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Section: Philosophical Consequences: the 'Fragmentation Challenge' An...mentioning

confidence: 89%

Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision

2023

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Color blindness and semantic knowledge: Cognition of color terms from elicited lists in dichromats and normal observers

Moreira,

Álvaro,

Lillo

2024

Color Research & Application

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Color blindness (color vision deficiency) affects ~8% of males and ~ 0.4% females worldwide. Here we use the elicited lists method to investigate their semantic knowledge regarding “basic color terms” and their relationships. Lists were obtained from color vision deficient and normal observers. 32 dichromats (15 protanopes, 17 deuteranopes) and 32 normal trichromats (17 females, 15 males) diagnosed by a battery of color tests (Ishihara, City University Test, anomaloscope) wrote monolexemic lists of colors. Psychological salience of terms (ln(CSI)), adjacency between pairs of terms (ADJ; MDS) and the presence of clusters of terms defined on the basis of the Universals and evolution hypothesis were analyzed. All four groups of participants showed the same semantic memory structure: lists started with the cardinal primaries cluster (blue, red, yellow, green), followed by the achromatic primaries cluster (black and white), or the derived cluster (brown, orange, violet, pink, purple, and gray). After the clusters (cardinals, achromatics, and derived), a highly variable number of non‐basic terms appeared. This number was higher in normal trichromats. Non‐basic terms were not part of any cognitive cluster. The similarity in the lists of trichromats and dichromats suggest that both may acquire similar semantic knowledge about color terms. Several potential explanations are considered.

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What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience

Cited by 2 publications

References 33 publications

Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision

Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision

Color blindness and semantic knowledge: Cognition of color terms from elicited lists in dichromats and normal observers

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