What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence

Dickinson, David L.; Tiefenthaler, Jill

doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00500.x

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…First, people can vary in their subjective beliefs about what counts as a selfish allocation of money in dictator games depending on the situation (Carlson et al, 2020; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Dickinson & Tiefenthaler, 2002; Konow, 2000). To illustrate, few people would perceive someone as selfish for not giving a cut of their paycheck to a stranger, yet when dictator games use money a participant earned, rather than money endowed by experimenters, the resulting decline in giving behavior is still described as an increase in pure self-interest (Cherry et al, 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008).…”

Section: Current Models Of Selfishnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological Selfishness

Carlson

Adkins

Crockett

et al. 2022

Perspect Psychol Sci

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Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often draw on classical conceptions of selfishness from evolutionary biology (i.e., selfish gene theory), economics (i.e., rational self-interest), and philosophy (i.e., psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the psychology of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit the self that disregards others’ desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life—facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how using this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate the negative effects of selfishness.

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Section: Current Models Of Selfishnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological Selfishness

Carlson

Adkins

Crockett

et al. 2022

Perspect Psychol Sci

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“…Second, when the origin of the endowment used in the DG bargain arises from preplay labor of the participants, average sharing drops to near-zero when the proposer’s effort creates the endowment (Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002) and increases strikingly when the receiver’s effort creates the endowment (Oxoby and Spraggon 2008). And third, assignment of subjects to either the role of proposer or receiver based on the outcome of preplay contests affects sharing, with higher allocations going to relatively higher performers in these contests (Dickinson and Tiefenthaler 2002; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996). On the basis of this and similar evidence from the experimental literature (Ruffle 1998; Fahr and Irlenbusch 2000; Konow 2000), the beginnings of a systematic qualitative story emerges that suggests that notions of entitlement enter into the decision to share or not share.…”

Section: Related Experimental Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production from One, Distribution to All? Examining Effort-Based Distributional Norms in a Controlled Lab Study

Carr

Mellizo

2022

Review of Radical Political Economics

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In the standard Ultimatum Game, a proposer is provided with a sum of money by the experimenter. The proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a responder that, if accepted, is divided in the proposed manner. If the responder rejects the offer, both receive nothing. We modify this framework by providing the proposer with an endowment created by work performed by the responder prior to participating in an Ultimatum Game. We find that average offers by proposers increase. Responders, however, are less likely to reject a given size offer when compared with the standard, experimenter-provided endowment. We take this as evidence that the mode of production affects distributional outcomes, a result that is at odds with conventional economic approaches, but consistent with arguments expressed by Marx and others. JEL Classification: C91, D30, D63

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“…This work more generally relates to the huge literature on gender differences in decision making. Behavioural scientists have explored gender differences in several decisional domains, including competition (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004;Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007;Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009), risk aversion (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), cooperation (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011;Rand, 2017), altruism (Eagly & Crowley, 1986;Engel, 2011;Rand et al 2016;Brañas-Garza et al 2018), honesty (Capraro, 2018;Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019;Gerlach, Teodorescu, & Hertwig, 2019), the equity-efficiency trade-off (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001;Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002;Fehr, Naef and Schmidt, 2006;Stieglitz, Gurven, Kaplan, and Hopfensitz, 2017;Capraro, 2019), and harm aversion (Fumagalli et al 2010;Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015;Capraro & Sippel, 2017). Our work differs from these papers, in that it explores gender differences in the way people discriminate the two genders when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperation; this type of gender difference was not previously explored.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?

Barcelo¹,

Capraro²

2020

Preprint

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Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding. In this paper we report on two pre-registered experiments, that we hope shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N=1,077) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing (rewarding) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot public goods game. In this study, punishment/reward is implemented by asking participants whether they want to pay a cost to decrease/increase the payoff of a defector/cooperator. Study 2 (N=253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding; participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator from 1 to 5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. All these results are robust to splitting the sample by gender: in our context, neither men nor women discriminate between genders when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators.

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What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence

Cited by 17 publications

References 26 publications

Psychological Selfishness

Psychological Selfishness

Production from One, Distribution to All? Examining Effort-Based Distributional Norms in a Controlled Lab Study

Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?

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