What Is Elisabeth’s Cartesianism?

Kambouchner, Denis

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71527-4_12

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

2021

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-71527-4_12

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What Is Elisabeth’s Cartesianism?

Denis Kambouchner

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“…See also Tollefsen who focuses on the interaction problem and defends the claim that Elisabeth's objection 'is a novel one and arose from careful consideration Descartes's physics, ' (1999: 61); and Agostini (2014) who focuses on the question of union and whether the soul is material in an examination of whether Elisabeth is truly Cartesian. For other discussions of the correspondence that focus on Elisabeth, see Zedler (1989), Rodis-Lewis (1999), Nye (1999), Shapiro (1999), Janssen-Lauret (2018), Schmaltz (2019), Alanen (2021), Kambouchner (2021), and Pellegrin (2021). Stencil Journal of Modern Philosophy DOI: 10.32881/jomp.158…”

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Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Soul

Stencil

2023

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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In the 1640's Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes engaged in a philosophically rich correspondence. The most well-known aspect of the correspondence begins with a question Elisabeth asks Descartes about his account of the interaction between soul and body. This objection, often called the 'problem of interaction', has received much attention in contemporary scholarship and this attention frequently focuses on the exchange between Elisabeth and Descartes. Following the lead of Descartes himself, the majority of scholars treat the problem of interaction as the core, or even the entirety, of Elisabeth's objections to Descartes from this stage in the correspondence. In this paper I argue that the driving force of Elisabeth's objections to Descartes' account is not the problem of interaction. Rather, Elisabeth's objections to Descartes fundamentally concern Descartes' account of the nature of the soul. While Elisabeth clearly offers the problem of interaction, it is only one of several worries each of which is designed to show that Descartes' account of the soul is insufficient. I argue that Elisabeth raises three distinct problems to Descartes' account of the nature of the soul: the causal interface problem, the vapors problem and the principal attribute problem.

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Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Soul

Stencil

2023

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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What Is Elisabeth’s Cartesianism?

Cited by 1 publication

References 5 publications

Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Soul

Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Soul

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