What is Analytic Philosophy?

Abstract

2 As Glock notes, something like it has been offered by Sluga (212, 219). See Sluga 1998.

Philosophy as Paradigms: An Account of a Contextual Metaphilosophical Perspective

“…Historical reminders such as the effects of the division on the function of certain journals and departments, and on the policies of certain publishing houses and bookstores, and incidents like Carnap's attack on Heidegger in the 1930s, the long quarrel between Derrida and Searle in the 1970s and 80s triggered by their debate over Austin's speech act theory, the 19. An interesting addition to the relevant literature with regard to the analytic tradition is Glock (2008) in which Glock extends and elaborates-from a historicist perspective, albeit a weak one (ibid., pp. 89-114)-on Sluga's family-resemblance conception of analytic philosophy as presented in Sluga (1998).…”

Analytic Philosophy

“…Can we still make sense of the term “analytic philosophy”? Hans‐Johann Glock (2008) has recently made a book‐length attempt to clarify what we can reasonably mean by it. His book has the virtue of a descriptive approach; he distinguishes much more clearly than most other authors on the subject between the two issues what we should mean by the term “analytic philosophy” and whether or not philosophy should be, in that sense, analytic.…”

Is There a Methodological Divide between Analytic and Continental Philosophy of Music? Response to Roholt

“…It should be clear to anyone familiar with the relevant literature that the essentialist attempt to provide definitions (for example, Dummett ), namely, to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as either analytic or continental philosophy, has been shown to be highly problematic. In place of such definitions, some scholars have opted for overall accounts of analytic (Glock ; Stroll ) and continental (Reynolds and Chase ) philosophy by appealing to broad family resemblances. The notion of “tendency” that Roholt has used in discussing methodological divides is analogous to the notion of family resemblance used in the aforementioned metaphilosophical context.…”

“…Yet there is no reason why variants of Merleau‐Ponty's opposition to the empiricist “myth of the given” could not be formulated and defended without recourse to phenomenological methodology. It is furthermore clear that the analytic–continental divide is not reducible to disagreements over particular philosophical doctrines or views (rather than methods), given the variety of overlapping doctrines and views defended by analytic and continental philosophers (see, for example, Glock , 115–150).…”