What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms, policies and perspectives

Boucher, Sandy C.

doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0400-y

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…As presented by van Fraassen, it is also vague (or anyway has been criticized as such). Other authors (see, e.g., Boucher, 2014;Chakravartty, 2011;Lipton, 2004;Rowbottom, 2011;Teller, 2004) have attempted to make the concept more precise, in particular by appealing to pragmatic and value-based considerations to flesh out how one can choose between competing stances, but the essentially voluntaristic nature of a stance is nevertheless maintained by these authors.…”

Section: Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Open Systems View

Cuffaro¹,

Hartmann²

2021

Preprint

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There is a deeply entrenched view in philosophy and physics, the closed systems view, according to which isolated systems are conceived of as fundamental. On this view, when a system is under the influence of its environment this is described in terms of a coupling between it and a separate system which taken together are isolated. We argue against this view, and in favor of the alternative open systems view, for which systems interacting with their environment are conceived of as fundamental, and the environment's influence is represented via the dynamical equations that govern the system's evolution. Taking quantum theories of closed and open systems as our case study, and considering three alternative notions of fundamentality: (i) ontic fundamentality, (ii) epistemic fundamentality, and (iii) explanatory fundamentality, we argue that the open systems view is fundamental, and that this has important implications for the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of science, and for metaphysics.

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Section: Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Open Systems View

Cuffaro¹,

Hartmann²

2021

Preprint

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“…For now, we need just note that the key features of stances in van Fraassen's sense are: They are not reducible to beliefs; they are adopted rather than believed, like approaches or policies. They are in large part non‐propositional ; so, they are not to be thought of as true or false. They are largely values‐driven . One adopts a stance which coheres well with one's values, both epistemic and nonepistemic (van Fraassen , 62; Chakravartty , 49; Boucher ). They are pragmatically justified in part in terms of their fruits; one adopts a stance at least partly on the basis of the consequences of doing so (Boucher ). …”

Section: Van Fraassen On Stancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Van Fraassen's paradigms of philosophical stances are empiricism, materialism (physicalism), naturalism and secularism (2002). The question of the nature and content of a philosophical stance has been widely debated (see van Fraassen , , , , , , , , ; Finch ; Chakravartty , , ; Horsten ; Ladyman , ; Teller ; Rowbottom , ; Cruse ; Ho ; Jauernig ; McMullin ; Mohler ; Baumann ; Rowbottom and Bueno ; Boucher , , ), but for the purposes of this paper the above should be sufficient.…”

Section: Van Fraassen On Stancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is the Relation between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs?

Boucher

2018

Dialectica

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Van Fraassen's view that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs, has become increasingly popular. But the precise relation between a philosophical stance, and the factual beliefs that typically accompany it, is an unresolved issue. It is widely accepted that no factual belief is sufficient for holding a particular stance, but some have argued that holding certain factual beliefs is nonetheless necessary for adopting a given stance. I argue against this claim, along with the weaker claim that while there are no beliefs that are necessary for adopting a particular stance, those who share a stance must share some characteristic belief(s) in common. I outline and defend an alternative 'cluster' account, according to which, in order to accept a stance, one must hold some minimal subset of the set of theoretical beliefs characteristic of the stance in question. This view can accommodate the intuitions motivating those who defend the stronger necessity claims, while crucially allowing for the flexibility of a stance vis-à-vis the relevant factual beliefs, and its relative independence from those beliefs, which is central to van Fraassen's main examples of stances and their nature.

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“…In the literature on stances two issues have loomed large: First, what precisely is a stance? (See Boucher .) And second, how, if at all, can the adoption of a stance be rationally justified, given that stances are not reducible to beliefs?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… I have argued (Boucher ) that the gene's eye view, at least on Dawkins's conventionalist interpretation of it, is best understood as a van Fraassian stance.…”

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confidence: 99%

Stances and Epistemology: Values, Pragmatics, and Rationality

Boucher

2018

Metaphilosophy

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Bas van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. This paper discusses the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. It argues that stances may be justified pragmatically, in terms of both their epistemic fruits and their coherence with our values, both epistemic and non-epistemic. It also examines van Fraassens version of epistemological voluntarism, which has received considerable attention of late, and shows that it provides a theoretical framework, and approach to epistemology, within which the pragmatic and valuebased forms of justification appropriate to stance choice find a natural home.1 It is potentially self-undermining, rather than just self-undermining, since the thought is that if empiricism is true, then empiricism could be false, not that if empiricism is true then it is false. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this important distinction.2 See also Bealer (1992) for a similar argument.

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What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms, policies and perspectives

Cited by 18 publications

References 40 publications

The Open Systems View

The Open Systems View

What is the Relation between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs?

Stances and Epistemology: Values, Pragmatics, and Rationality

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