What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within

Abstract

The ruler’s ability to cope with crises is critical for authoritarian durability. Yet, the coping mechanism—the actual management strategies by which rulers confront crises—is largely treated as a black box. This study takes a step in addressing this problem by examining how rulers use their appointment powers to manage the crisis that is the aftermath of failed coups. I argue that the principle challenge of this period is that rulers cannot identify the opposition and to cope, they deliberately infuse the center of the regime with officials from the periphery to dilute and ultimately weaken the invisible enemy they confront. Using a novel dataset on the appointments of mid and high level officials over the course of 34 years in Ethiopia, I find that the ruler relied considerably on outside officials following the failed coup in 1960 in ways he never did before or after the event.

The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships

“…If presented with a credible option to topple the regime some insiders opt not to, they are tacitly accepting the legitimacy of the leader. 8 Woldense (2022) suggests that some co-conspirators may evade notice and still constitute an invisible enemy. However, it is likely that some can be later identified as captured coup makers are tortured and otherwise coerced into revealing their identities.…”

“…Consequently, failed coups rarely reveal much about the relative strengths of either coup plotters or surviving leaders.' 12 Loyalty is typically increased by installing relatives and/or co-ethnics (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018) or even outsiders (including foreigners) (Woldense 2022) in top positions and in the security forces. Challenges and defections become more unlikely since the fate of handpicked elites is tied more closely to that of the dictator and they lack independent support bases.…”

“…Furthermore, although a logical immediate response, purges are just a partial, momentary tactic, which cannot solidify a dictator's power in the long-term, as some studies posit, unless accompanied by other measures. Extensive purges can alienate remaining elites and spur retaliation, do not guarantee their long-term loyalty, and may leave some co-conspirators undetected and unpunished (Easton and Siverson 2018; Sudduth 2017; Thyne and Powell 2016; Woldense 2022).…”

“… 8 Woldense (2022) suggests that some co-conspirators may evade notice and still constitute an invisible enemy. However, it is likely that some can be later identified as captured coup makers are tortured and otherwise coerced into revealing their identities.…”

Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

“…Coup attempts may fail, and participants of failed coups face dire consequences. At best, they are purged from the regime, and at worst, they are jailed or executed (Woldense 2022). Thus, although the prize of capturing the state is large, we anticipate that military elites are content to accept power-sharing relationships when the arrangement is credible-given the sizable risks of a failed coup.…”