What Governs Tree Harvesting in Community Forestry—Regulatory Instruments or Forest Bureaucrats’ Discretion?

Abstract

Community forestry is required to follow a forest management plan (FMP) to ensure sustainable tree harvesting. However, the role of FMPs or forest bureaucrats' discretion in guiding harvesting decisions and the resultant effects has not been explored. This paper investigates tree harvesting practices in community forests (CF) and its effects on forest sustainability, using the forest inventory panel dataset for three consecutive periods (2010, 2013 and 2016), together with qualitative information obtained by key informant interviews and a review of records of the community forest users' group. Harvesting decisions in the CF are largely guided by the decrees or schematic instructions of forest bureaucrats, where the role of the FMP remains highly contested. Whether harvesting decisions should be guided by the prescriptions of the FMP or should be regulated through decrees is a matter of discourse. Forest bureaucrats are arbitrarily reducing harvesting quantities and rarely referring to the prescriptions of the FMP. Consequently, users are compelled to harvest less than half the quantity of trees prescribed in the FMP. Furthermore, they are only allowed to harvest poor quality and dead trees. As a result, the number of good quality trees has increased, while the number of seedlings and saplings has decreased significantly. Although harvesting of saplings and seedlings is a common practice, it is against the provisions of the FMP. Though the current bureaucratic discretion has shown quick short-term effects on the forest stand conditions, the long-term impacts should not be undermined. Our findings will be useful to implementors and policy makers in Nepal and other developing countries with similar circumstances for deciding the tree harvesting. We argue for a rational approach in designing harvesting prescriptions and complying with them rather than regulating harvesting practices through guidelines, circulars and bureaucratic discretion.

Growth Ring Measurements of Shorea robusta Reveal Responses to Climatic Variation

“…S. robusta can reach a DBH of up to 2.5 m during its maturity, and it can gain a height of up to 35 m [61]. In our study site, the average (maximum) DBH of the analysed sampled trees was 16.5 [23] cm, while the average height was 14 m. Similarly, the oldest recorded individual was 28 years old. The size class (age and DBH) distribution of the studied trees shows the current study forest stand to be still young.…”

“…Generally, BAI may continue to increase [64,65] or stabilize [64] in healthy stands, but it only shows a decreasing trend when trees begin to senesce or are subject to significant growth stress [5,64,66,67]. This finding is supported by the results from the analysis of the BAI from tree rings; however, management intervention effects in the same community managed forest was also observed in the S. robusta forest [23,44]. The appropriate management with the presence of different age classes is more important for the production of commercial saw-log.…”

“…Selective thinning practices may lead to the development of the crown, thereby allowing the trees to reach the target diameter much earlier [20,26]. In many studies, the lack of targeted thinning practices has been observed [23].…”

“…It covers circa 1 million ha, representing about 16% of the total forest area of the country [21,22]. In Nepal, community-based forest management was introduced in late 1970s, which gave priority on the conservation of degraded forests [23]. By doing this, community forests were successful in re-establishing the S. robusta tree species over a short period of time [24][25][26].…”

Forestland Concession, Land Rights, and Livelihood Changes of Ethnic Minorities: The Case of the Madhupur Sal Forest, Bangladesh

“…Nevertheless, the traditional forest policy and management plan by the Government of Bangladesh has never addressed the issue of the traditional land rights of ethnic people [15,21,39]. Similarly, the government's bureaucratic discretion has shown negative effects on forest conditions and development in Nepal as well [54] Forestland concession has not contributed to poverty alleviation, rather it undermines viable, alternative approaches to rural livelihood development, and in most cases, local communities claim to have lost their historical lands [52]. The Sal forestland concession and restrictions on the use of forest resources have had an immense impact on the daily living conditions of the poor, forest-dependent people [15,17,21].…”