What drives rental votes? How coalitions signals facilitate strategic coalition voting

Gschwend, Thomas; Stoetzer, Lukas F.; Zittlau, Steffen

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.011

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Given that voters have already formed preexisting political attitudes about parties and (some) coalitions, it is likely that those attitudes affect the voting decision one way or another. This perspective reflects the current consensus in the literature on coalition voting (e.g., Aldrich et al 2004;Bargsted and Kedar 2009;Blais et al 2006;Duch et al 2010;Gschwend et al 2016;Kedar 2011;Meffert and Gschwend 2010). As long as party and coalition preferences are together on the right-hand side of any votechoice model, this implies that a voter-no matter how the respective systematic component of the model does parameterize her decision-making process-will employ both components simultaneously.…”

Section: How Coalition Signals Matter: a Theoretical Decision Modelmentioning

confidence: 79%

“…Such "coalition signals" are prominently covered by the media, which is then eager to further speculate about the composition of the next government. In practice, coalition signals can offer crucial information to voters (Gschwend, Stoetzer, and Zittlau 2016). As one preelectoral coalition strategy (Golder 2005(Golder , 2006, coalition signals may provide guidance about which coalition governments are conceivable politically and likely to gain a majority in parliament.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Weighting Parties and Coalitions: How Coalition Signals Influence Voting Behavior

Gschwend

Meffert

Stoetzer

2017

The Journal of Politics

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Democratic accountability is characterized as weak in parliamentary systems where voters cannot choose their government directly. We argue that coalition signals about desirable and undesirable coalitions that might be formed after the election help to provide this essential aspect of democratic government. We propose a simple model that identifies the effect of coalition signals on individual vote decisions. Based on survey experiments in two different countries we show how coalition signals change the relative weight of voters' party and coalition considerations. Coalition signals increase the importance of coalition considerations and, at the same time, decrease the importance of party considerations in voters' decision calculus, leading some voters to change their vote intention.

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Section: How Coalition Signals Matter: a Theoretical Decision Modelmentioning

confidence: 79%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighting Parties and Coalitions: How Coalition Signals Influence Voting Behavior

Gschwend

Meffert

Stoetzer

2017

The Journal of Politics

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“…The aim of this research is to analyse to what extent the data collected from Twitter can be used to measure the political distances between parties, and, consequently, the likelihood of a given coalition to succeed in the bargaining process after the elections. Previous literature in coalition formation has found that people consider their coalition preferences when voting (Plescia & Aichholzer, 2017), and that coalition signals facilitate strategic coordination among voters (Gschwend, Stoetzer, & Zittlau, 2016).…”

Section: The Present Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Efforts may be put in the analysis of the behaviour of users in social networks and, in particular, in their retweeting behaviour. Since people consider their coalition preferences when voting (Plescia & Aichholzer, 2017), and coalition signals lead them to strategic coordination (Gschwend, Stoetzer, & Zittlau, 2016), we may also be aware of how voters' preferences have an influence on their behavior is social networks. This paper contributes to the knowledge and interpretation of the retweet behaviour of users in political discussions.…”

Section: Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

Government Formation and Political Discussions in Twitter: An Extended Model for Quantifying Political Distances in Multiparty Democracies

Guerrero-Solé

López-González

2017

Social Science Computer Review

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The Retweet Overlap Network (RON) method has proved to be successful in quantifying the distances between political parties in multiparty democracies (Guerrero-Solé, Corominas-Murtra & López-González, 2014; Guerrero-Solé, 2017). These distances are frequently used in political science to explain the formation of coalitions and governments (Volden & Carrubba, 2004). This paper aims to explore how the data collected from Twitter can be related to the ideological similarities between political parties drawing on an extended development of the RON method that calculates the overlaps between the communities of retweeters of the most influential users in a political discussion. The method is applied to two conversations in Twitter during the last two General Elections in Spain in 2015 and 2016. Our results are consistent with the dynamics and the outcomes of the bargaining processes after both elections, and support Spanish President's statement on the reasonableness of a government of the Popular Party (PP), the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Citizens-Party of the Citizenry (Cs) (Del Riego, 2016) after the Spanish General Elections in 2016. 2 This work links quantitative analysis of the overlaps of the parties' communities of retweeters with the theories of coalition and government formation. It aims to be a contribution to the exploration of Twitter metrics that can be used as new indicators of the support for coalitions in multiparty democracies.

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“…Die entsprechenden Werte der langfristigen Parteienstärke sind in Tabelle 2 zusammengefasst. (Gschwend et al 2016, nichts entgegen. Jede CDU-geführte Regierung würde allerdings bei der ersten Bundestagswahl nach der kommenden Wahl im September gegen eine erhebliche Wechselstimmung ankämpfen müssen, da der entsprechende Abnützungseffekt nun auf ‚4' steigen würde.…”

Section: Die Vorhersage Für 2017unclassified

Nicht was Du denkst! Was wir wirklich von Wahlvorhersagen lernen können

Strijbis¹

2017

PVS

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As this forum demonstrates, the competition between election forecasting models along the US model becomes standard also in Germany. This raises the question about the scientific relevance of this undertaking. It is often argued that election forecasts provide a particularly hard and hence good test for the falsification of theories of electoral behavior. In this contribution, I contest this argument and show that the forecast models presented in this issue hardly contribute to the falsification of theories. Instead I refer to an often overlooked relevance of election forecasts consisting in the models' potential for opera-tionalizing important variables. I illustrate my argument by referring to the literature on prediction markets. The Chancellor Model predicts that the 2017 Bundestag election will most likely confirm Angela Merkel for another term as head of the federal government. As of June this year, she leads her Social Democratic challenger Martin Schulz by a wide enough margin in chancellor popularity to overcome any fatigue with her tenure after three terms. Besides continuing with the Grand Coalition, Merkel also has the option of entering a Jamaicacoalition (with the FDP and Greens), which would command a majority in the new Bundestag. A shift in chancellor popularity, however, would change the forecast. In the event that Schulz ultimately surpasses Merkel in chancellor popularity, as he did in late February, the SPD candidate would be more likely to head the next German government.

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What drives rental votes? How coalitions signals facilitate strategic coalition voting

Cited by 18 publications

References 24 publications

Weighting Parties and Coalitions: How Coalition Signals Influence Voting Behavior

Weighting Parties and Coalitions: How Coalition Signals Influence Voting Behavior

Government Formation and Political Discussions in Twitter: An Extended Model for Quantifying Political Distances in Multiparty Democracies

Nicht was Du denkst! Was wir wirklich von Wahlvorhersagen lernen können

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