What Do We Mean by ‘Rethinking Regulation’?

Deighton-Smith, Rex

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2007.00567.x

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

(1 reference statement)

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“…Although not clearly reflected in the shorthand descriptions such as ‘best practice regulation’ or ‘deregulation’, the guiding concept of this type of regulation review is that the government's role in regulating the economy should be kept to a minimum. Deregulation emerged in the 1970s as a response to the perception that economic slowdown had been caused by excess government regulation and became part of the Reagan and Thatcher ideology of ‘small government’ . In Australia, as elsewhere, the ideological content of deregulation has been softened to requiring that government intervention occur only when there is evidence that doing so will be effective (with effectiveness normally but not exclusively counted in financial terms).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The possibility of regulating for obesity prevention–understanding regulation in theCommonwealthGovernment

et al. 2012

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A complex regulatory package is likely to be necessary to effectively reduce obesity prevalence in developed countries. This study investigated the barriers and facilitators to implementing regulatory interventions to prevent obesity within the executive arm of the Australian Commonwealth Government. Policy reviews were conducted on nine government departments to understand their roles and interests in obesity. From this process we identified regulatory review carried out by the Office of Best Practice Regulation as possibly posing a barrier to law reform for obesity prevention, along with the complexity of the food policymaking structures. The policy reviews informed subsequent in-depth semi-structured interviews with senior Commonwealth government officers (n = 13) focused on refining our understanding of the barriers to enacting obesity prevention policy. In addition to the two barriers already identified, interviewees identified a lack of evidence for interventions, which would reduce obesity prevalence, and the influence of politicians on executive decisions as posing obstacles. Most interviewees believed that the barriers to regulating to prevent obesity were strong and that intervention by elected politicians would be the most likely method of implementing obesity prevention policy.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The possibility of regulating for obesity prevention–understanding regulation in theCommonwealthGovernment

et al. 2012

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“…reforms that would reduce the impost of regulation on entities ( (Bunea amd Ibenskas, 2017;De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 2015). Nevertheless, while a number of tools exist to rethink and improve regulation (Deighton-Smith, 2008), few studies of 'sunsetting' (repealing and reinvigorating older statutes) are available, a matter we seek to address.…”

Section: Nonprofit Regulatory Reform: Distinguishing Between Mutual-bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…reforms that would reduce the impost of regulation on entities (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017;De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 2015). Nevertheless, while a number of tools exist to rethink and improve regulation (Deighton-Smith, 2008), (underpinning mutual-benefit entities) and the relative need to ensure public-benefit entities act in the public interest. The discussion and conclusion include limitations and future research opportunities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory reform: distinguishing between mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities

Cordery

Sim

2019

JPBAFM

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse nonprofit regulation through comparing and contrasting mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities. It ascertains how these entities differ in size, publicness, tax benefits and whether these differences might suggest regulatory costs should be differentiated. Design/methodology/approach This mixed-methods study utilises financial data, submissions and interviews. Findings There are stark differences in these two types of regulated nonprofit entities. Members should be the primary monitoring agency/ies for mutual-benefit entities, but financial reports should be understandable to these members. Nevertheless, the availability of tax concessions, combined with the benefits of limited liability, suggest mutual-benefit entities should be regulated and monitored by government in a way sympathetic to their size. Research limitations/implications As with most research, a limitation is this study’s focus on a single jurisdiction. Practical implications The differences in these entities’ characteristics are important for designing regulation. Social implications Better regulation is likely to require a standard set of financial reporting standards. Government has the right to demand disclosures due to benefits mutual-benefit entities enjoy. Originality/value In comparison to studies utilising only public-benefit data, this study uses unique data sets to compare public-benefit and mutual-benefit entities and presents nonprofit sector participant’s perceptions of these differences in context. This enables analysis of how better regulation could be achieved.

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“…Regulation is a core governmental activity. With time, all governments create new regulation, sometimes de‐regulate, and otherwise reform regulation as substantive conceptualisations of public interests shift, and new regulatory theories, strategies, and practices emerge (Braithwaite ; Hood et al ; Baldwin and Black ; Deighton‐Smith ). However, certain substantive regulatory goals have proven to be durable, among which, the pursuit of attractive built environments can be included (Talen ).…”

Section: Beauty and ‘Good Design’: Contemporary Aesthetic Regulation mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contingent Public Value of ‘Good Design’: Regulating the Aesthetics of the Australian Urban Built Environment

Beer

2014

Aust J Public Adm

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The proposition that the urban built environment can, and indeed should, be made more visually attractive is a long‐standing feature of the governance of Australian cities. In this vein, this paper examines how ‘good design’ in terms of visual aesthetics is currently pursued including through the development assessment process and the work of government architects. The paper begins by tracing the background of contemporary regulatory practice from long‐standing ideas around beauty and its value through to the urban design movement of today. Next, it considers in more detail various rationales for aesthetic governance and what might be better forms of regulatory practice. In short, it will be argued that while there can be scope for regulation to deliver superior outcomes, this practice must be sensitive to a high degree of contingency in what the public values and that deliberate empirical inquiry into the latter is desirable.

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What Do We Mean by ‘Rethinking Regulation’?

Cited by 11 publications

References 2 publications

The possibility of regulating for obesity prevention–understanding regulation in theCommonwealthGovernment

The possibility of regulating for obesity prevention–understanding regulation in theCommonwealthGovernment

Regulatory reform: distinguishing between mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities

The Contingent Public Value of ‘Good Design’: Regulating the Aesthetics of the Australian Urban Built Environment

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