“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”

Osborne, Robert Carry

doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01469-0

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Yet it is not clear that this is a point about more lax autonomy constraints in 19 The parenthesis is relevant since some believe that beliefs may be wrong in themselves (see, e.g., Basu. 2019;Basu and Schroeder, 2019;Schroeder, 2018; for criticism, see, e.g., Enoch and Spectre, forthcoming;Osborne, 2021). But even if that is true, it is hard to see how they can be wrong qua violating the autonomy of the one figuring in the belief (which is what is at stake when discussing the wrongness of paternalism; we worry about paternalism because we care about autonomy).…”

Section: Vulnerability and Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Bengtson,

Midtgaard

2023

J. Moral Philos.

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Section: Vulnerability and Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Bengtson,

Midtgaard

2023

J. Moral Philos.

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“…Thus, the line of critique is distinct from other lines of critique because it identifies an alternate (zetetic, rather than epistemic) moral wronging. Osborne (2021), following Sanford Goldberg (2019Goldberg ( , 2020, argues cases of doxastic wronging from the literature can be explained away by value-reflecting reasons. Value-reflecting reasons are the practical reasons produced by what one values.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging

Atkins

2023

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the degree of inquiry right-a novel account of zetetic obligations to inquire when interests are at stake. The degree of inquiry right is a moral right against other epistemic agents to inquire to a certain threshold when a belief undermines one's interests. Thus, the agents are sometimes obligated to leave inquiry open. I argue that we have relevant interests in reputation, relationships, and the well-being of our social groups. These interests generate obligations against others to "do their homework" before closing inquiry. This alternate account makes better sense of puzzles that accounts of doxastic wronging fall prey to. I.1 It's noteworthy that several authors have identified that a right to privacy generates some epistemic obligations. Basu (2021), following Thomson (1975) and Marmor (2015), suggests that the right to privacy involves hiding certain facts about ourselves from others. This is because of a strong preference that others do not form true belief about us. Basu thinks that this shows that there are some morally relevant aspects to forming beliefs, which, she thinks, undermines purism. Similarly, Munch (2021, 2022 thinks that the right to privacy generates direct doxastic duties, e.g., a duty not to generalize based on statistical evidence. My account of the degree of inquiry right deviates from this literature. Part of the upshot of this piece is that we have specifically doxastic interests-and thus, specifically doxastic rights. For more on the right to privacy, see Hunter (2018).

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“…Following Osborne (2021), I take 'doxastic norms' to refer to norms on belief, and 'epistemic norms' to concern norms on believing that have knowledge, warrant, and true belief as their aim. How should we understand the term 'epistemic hypocrisy'?…”

Section: Clarifying the Investigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

Piovarchy¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper introduces the concept of epistemic hypocrisy, arguing that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, I argue that a commitment account of standing to blame allows us to understand our objections to epistemic hypocrisy. Agents lack the epistemic standing to blame when they are not sufficiently committed to the norms they are blaming others for violating. This not only gives us a convincing account of epistemic standing to blame, it leaves us with a unified account of moral standing and epistemic standing. I also consider some potential asymmetries between the standing to engage in moral blame and the standing to engage in epistemic blame, arguing such asymmetries are either only apparent or can be explained away by extraneous factors.

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“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”

Cited by 10 publications

References 14 publications

Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging

Epistemic Hypcocrisy and Standing to Blame

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