What Determines the Suspension of Budget Support?

Abstract

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Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa

“…In the case of Niger, ECOWAS pushed for sanctions and there was domestic pressure. The Kenyan case highlights the importance of the public opinion in the donor country: the EU reacted to media attention, humanitarian consequences and security implications for European citizens (see Fisher, 2015;Hackenesch, 2015;Koch, 2015;Molenaers et al, 2015).…”

“…As providing general budget support is often seen as legitimizing the partner government, this is particularly sensitive in the case of authoritarian governments. Donors are particularly wary of disbursing budget support in situations of political crisis (Hayman, 2011;Molenaers, Gagiano, Smets, & Dellepiane, 2015;Reinsberg, 2015).…”

Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions

“…On the other hand, foreign aid is an essential tool for promoting security and economic interests and for exporting ideology (Bermeo 2017; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Mesquita and Smith 2007; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998). In the past 20 years, OECD donors have also begun to use the promise of aid or, perhaps more commonly, the threat of its withdrawal, to promote political ends such as improved democracy, more respect for human rights, and better governance (Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout 2009; Crawford 2001; Molenaers et al 2015; Swedlund 2017; Winters and Martinez 2015). Using a single tool to pursue multiple foreign policy goals, however, can generate challenging tensions when making decisions regarding its use (Morgenthau 1962).…”

Economic sanctions and income inequality: impacts of trade restrictions and foreign aid suspension on target countries

“…This enables greater donor control over the allocation of foreign aid within recipient countries as well as diminishing recipient governments’ discretion to redirect aid for their political benefits. In addition, project aid is often delivered by NGOs bypassing recipient governments, which might further reduce the likelihood that aid enriches political and economic elite groups rather than the needy (Findley et al, 2017; Molenaers et al, 2015; Winters, 2010; Winters and Martinez, 2015).…”