What Determines State Capture in Poland?

Alwasiak, Stanisław; Lewandowska-Kalina, Monika; Kalina, Lech; Kowalewski, Oskar; Możdżeń, Michał; Rybiński, Krzysztof

doi:10.7206/mba.ce.2084-3356.82

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…significantly decreasing the likelihood of state capture in that period (Alwasiak et al, 2013). Besides, the fiscal needs of the government may have an adverse effect on privatization trends, stimulating the cautious selling of the elements of state property; however, preferably, without losing control of it.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Change in Economic Policy Paradigm: Privatization and State Capture in Poland

Kozarzewski

Bałtowski

2016

SSRN Journal

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Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Change in Economic Policy Paradigm: Privatization and State Capture in Poland

Kozarzewski

Bałtowski

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…This is the tradition which this article is also strongly linked to. There are, of course, different explanations for the dynamics of the budgetary process (and public finance in general), which include e.g., political ideology (Veto Players Theory- [12]), internal power struggles within the political system (Selectorate Theory- [13]) or ease of access to the political sphere by external interest groups (Access Point Theory- [14], State Capture Theory-see [15]). One has to acknowledge an important vein of research into political budget cycles which deals with the dynamics of public expenditures and deficits with relation to electoral cycle [16][17][18][19][20][21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Determinants of Budgetary Expenditures. A BMA-Based Re-Evaluation of Contemporary Theories for OECD Countries

Beck

Możdżeń

2020

Sustainability

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The article tackles the problem of the most important institutional determinants of public expenditures. Within the traditions of public choice and institutional economics, it tests several theories ranging from the fiscal commons framework, Political Business/Budget Cycle (PBC) and path dependence to veto players theory. Its novelty compared to previous research stems from an attempt to test several theories simultaneously, dealing with model uncertainty by using sensitivity analysis within the Bayesian Model Averaging framework with a vast prior structure in terms of model, g and multicollinearity dilution priors. The results confirm several hypotheses tested in the area of fiscal management across the recent decades within the group of developed economies, giving especially strong support to the tragedy of the fiscal commons and path dependence concepts, while only partial support to veto players theory. In contrast, explanations based on political budget cycle (PBC) theory are dismissed. Among other interesting findings reported in the study, Scandinavian countries turn out to be the most fiscally responsible when other institutional factors are taken into account. Similarly, contrary to other recent research into the issue of EU fiscal institutional framework, Euro area countries are characterized by limited public expenditures.

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Partial state capture by a single oligarchic group: The Gorilla Case in Slovakia

Školkay¹

2018

SEPS

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The article discusses the Gorilla case, an officially still-contested partial state capture by a single local oligarchic group, in line with the (partial) Elite Cartels corruption pattern in Slovakia. Due to the manner in which evidence, although considered unofficial, was made available, this case illustrates secret political and business processes during partial state capture. The initial absence of the case in public, political, and academic discourses, suggests that state capture can be present and operate undetected for a long time. This study also shows that in-depth analysis of the Gorilla case was avoided by both domestic and international political scientists, despite its paramount practical and theoretical importance. This, in turn, reflects a methodological capture of political science. Consequently, this article disentangles the complexities of the Gorilla case and lays down the foundation for further studies. Specifically, it highlights the need for more careful research, terminological precision in both theorybuilding and empirical findings on state and media capture based on case studies, as well as reassessment of the methodology of political sciences used in these research areas.

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What Determines State Capture in Poland?

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Change in Economic Policy Paradigm: Privatization and State Capture in Poland

Change in Economic Policy Paradigm: Privatization and State Capture in Poland

Institutional Determinants of Budgetary Expenditures. A BMA-Based Re-Evaluation of Contemporary Theories for OECD Countries

Partial state capture by a single oligarchic group: The Gorilla Case in Slovakia

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