What Chinese courts could learn from the USA: the approach of public interest litigation under the new China Environmental Protection Law

Zhang, Zhuoxian

doi:10.4337/9781788114677.00019

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Environmental and social organizations can participate in the environmental game between the government and enterprises through various ways to make up for the inadequacy of government environmental protection norms in promoting enterprises to achieve green production and effectively repair the government's inability to fully perform its duties (Binder & Neumayer 2005;Chen et al 2016;Harangozó & Zilahy 2015). On the one hand, environmental social organizations can form strategic collaborative relationships with enterprises to help them establish green labels and improve their economic efficiency (Zhang 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises' Green Production Behavior in the Context of China's Economic Green Transformation

2024

Global NEST: The International Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

<p>In the context of China's critical economic transition towards sustainability, this research employs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, and environmental protection social organizations to investigate the evolutionary trajectory of enterprises' green production behaviors. By elucidating the equilibrium solution of the model and validating its local stability, the study aims to identify the key factors that contribute to steering the game towards a favorable state. The findings reveal that enterprises' decisions to adopt green production practices are primarily driven by cost-benefit considerations. Meanwhile, government interventions in regulating green production are influenced by factors such as resource input, punitive measures for non-compliance, and reward incentives. Additionally, the decisions of environmental protection social organizations to monitor enterprises' green production are shaped by factors like cost, financial support, and subsidy incentives. Ultimately, the study provides policy recommendations, emphasizing stakeholder perspectives, to encourage corporate green production. These insights not only aim to foster sustainable development among enterprises but also serve as a theoretical foundation for government policy formulation.</p>

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises' Green Production Behavior in the Context of China's Economic Green Transformation

2024

Global NEST: The International Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

What Chinese courts could learn from the USA: the approach of public interest litigation under the new China Environmental Protection Law

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises' Green Production Behavior in the Context of China's Economic Green Transformation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises' Green Production Behavior in the Context of China's Economic Green Transformation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About