IntroductionDebt contract is among the most important sources of conditional conservatism. The demand for conservative reporting flows from the agency cost of resolving uncertainty in the principal-agent setting. According to Watts, conservatism is an important mechanism that resolves agency cost. Managers have incentive to inflate accounting numbers in the statements of accounts where their performance is measured by earnings declared. Researchers who study accounting conservatism argue that conservative accounting limits a manager's incentive and ability to manipulate earnings thus yielding a more efficient contract. Watts argues that the contracting explanations for the existence of conservatism stem from the fact that the parties to the firm have asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited liability, and different time horizons [1].According to Watts and Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) suggests that the agency cost related to debt represent a specific setting that highlights the ambiguity about the role of conservatism. Agency conflicts exist between managers and creditors which give rise to concerns for creditors. These concerns are actions by firms that increase the risk or probability that the creditors will not see their investment returned.However, this earnings management behaviour can be mitigated by employing conservative reporting. Accounting conservatism is the differential verifiability required for the recognition of accounting gains versus losses that generates an understatement of net assets [2]. Lafond and Watts suggest that conservative financial reporting act as a governance mechanism that reduces the managers' ability to manipulate and overstate financial performance and increases the firm's cash flows and value [3].Conservative accounting reduces the tendency of managers to invest in negative NPV projects, making managers aware that they will not be able to defer the recognition of losses to the future and imposing greater costs to biasing financial reports upwards [4]. Thus, conservative accounting can be used as mechanism to motivate managers to cut losses earlier and abandon poorly performing projects. In addition, conservative accounting improves monitoring of debt contracts that can be written based on conservative numbers, triggering violations of debt covenants faster [1,4]. This paper investigates whether debt holders employs accounting conservatism in debt agreements with firm. Because of the benefits of accounting conservatism to debt holders, the author can expect negative relations between amount of debt and extent of conservative accounting practice. Also because management of the firm have possible short term tenure, adoption of income increasing accounting practice might be of detriment to the firm.Another explanation for possible negative relation between debt and accounting conservatism is due to costs associated with violation of debt contracts. Managers tend to overstate profits so as not to violate debt agreements. Therefore increase in declared earn...