Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie and the Philosophy of Science

Bianchi, Silvia De

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-51197-5_8

Cited by 9 publications

References 18 publications

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Temporal Experience

Torrengo

2024

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Many physical theories suggest that time does not pass, yet temporality deeply permeates our experience. We perceive change and movement, we are aware of living in the present, of the constant flux of our sensations and thoughts, and of time itself flowing. In this book, the author considers the core facts of temporal experience and their interconnections, ultimately defending the atomist dynamic model of temporal experience. The model is atomist because according to it we experience our own temporal position as undivided, and it is dynamic because it emphasizes the central role of the feeling of renewed experience as time progresses. The book critically examines prevalent theories of experience of change, presentness, succession, and passage of time both in philosophy and psychology. Each chapter contributes to the construction of the atomist dynamic model. Experience of change and movement are explained through mental events that present virtually instantaneous movement and change. The author challenges the common belief in the perception of ‘presentness’ and proposes an error theory based on narrative cognition. The experience of succession is elucidated through the concept of an overarching phenomenology, arguing against the tendency to overstate the phenomenal continuity of experience. Finally, the experience of the passage of time is approached through the non-representationalist theory of the phenomenal modifier. The author concludes by discussing the surprising consequences of applying the experiential model defended in the book to the scientific image of our existence in time as a sequence of physical events.

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