West Nile virus in Europe: after action reviews of preparedness and response to the 2018 transmission season in Italy, Slovenia, Serbia and Greece

Abstract

Background: After Action Reviews (AAR) with a One Health perspective were performed in Slovenia, Italy, Serbia and Greece following a severe West Nile virus (WNV) transmission season in 2018. A protocol combining traditional techniques and organizational process analysis was developed and then implemented in each country. Results: In 2018, response to the unusually intense transmission season of WNV in Slovenia, Italy, Serbia and Greece took place through routine response mechanisms. None of the four countries declared a national or subnational emergency. We found a very strong consensus on the strengths identified in responding to this event. All countries indicated the availability of One Health Plans for surveillance and response; very high laboratory diagnostic capacity in the human, veterinary and entomology sectors and strong inter-sectoral collaboration with strong commitment of engaged institutions as critical in the management of the event. Finally, countries implementing One Health surveillance for WNV (in terms of early warning and early activation of prevention measures) consistently reported a positive impact on their activities, in particular when combining mosquito and bird surveillance with surveillance of cases in humans and equids. Recurring priority areas for improvement included: increasing knowledge on vectorcontrol measures, ensuring the sustainability of vector monitoring and surveillance, and improving capacity to manage media pressure. Conclusions: The AARs presented here demonstrate the benefit of cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary approaches to preparedness for West Nile virus outbreaks in Europe. In the coming years, priorities include fostering and strengthening arrangements that: enable coordinated One Health surveillance and response during WNV transmission seasons; ensure adequate laboratory capacities; strengthen risk communication; and fund longer-term research to address the knowledge gaps identified in this study.

The Common European Mosquitoes Culex Pipiens and Aedes Albopictus Are Unable to Transmit SARS-CoV-2, After a Natural-mimicking Challenge With Infected Blood

“…This was con rmed later by experimental studies, which showed that SARS-CoV-2 is unable to replicate in Aedes mosquito cells in vitro [9] and in intrathoracically-infected Aedes aegypti, Aedes albopictus and Culex quinquefasciatus in USA [10]. No data are available yet for the species Culex pipiens, one of the most common human biter mosquito in Europe, where it is responsible for the transmission of West Nile and Usutu viruses [11]. In addition, a possible role of mosquitoes as mechanical vectors of viral etiological agents, including respiratory viruses, has already been observed [12][13].…”

West Nile virus in Portugal

“…The large European WNV epidemic of 2018 provided key opportunities to assess existing WNV surveillance and public health mechanisms. Countries implementing cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary early warning systems based on One Health surveillance (vector, avian, equine and human) consistently reported positive impacts of such infrastructures [19]. Common areas for possible improvement included investment and sustainability of mosquito surveillance, and improved information and media management.…”

“…The recent epidemiological history of WNV in Europe is characterised by increasing epidemic activity in countries including France, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Ukraine [18,19]. In 2018, the continent reported its largest epidemic ever across many countries, exceeding cumulative infections since 2010 [20].…”

Spatio-Temporal Distribution of Aedes Albopictus and Culex Pipiens along an Urban-Natural Gradient in the Ventotene Island, Italy

“…At present, the most common strategy to reduce transmission risk is by reducing vector abundance. However, there is a growing need for stronger evidence supporting the impact of vector-control in reducing West Nile transmission [ 30 ] in the face of the increasing costs of vector control. The lack of action thresholds and public health outcome assessments are also major drawbacks in optimizing vector control [ 31 ].…”