Werte bei Carnap

Influences on the Aufbau

“…In conclusion, I remain suspicious that with the textual evidence that is presently available, it can be convincingly demonstrated "that the constitutional theory of Aufbau became fi rst of all designed as a modernised and formalised version of Rickert 's constitutional theory", as Mormann ( 2007b ) has proposed. 32 I claim that (when putting together our textual evidence in 1-4 above) we can conclude that there is a strong case for stating that Carnap 's Aufbau project was fi rst designed after Rickert's example in System der Philosophie.…”

“…23 22 For the later Carnap 's means of dealing with values see , Kaplan (1963), and Mormann ( 2006 ). By eliminating values from the realm of objects, which can be constituted, an explicit and rational discussion of these issues fell outside the realm of rational discourse.…”

“…Be this as it may, this peculiar writing does not have a resemblance to (or, in fact, anything to do with) "Vom Chaos'" methodological "fi ctionalism". However, even so, I can show as a hard fact that (4) Carnap 29 This point of view has been put forward by Mormann ( 2007b ): "(…) I want to demonstrate that the constitutional theory of Aufbau became fi rst of all designed as a modernized and formalized version of Rickert 's constitutional theory, as he had put it forward in System der Philosophie (Rickert 1921 ). System der Philosophie .…”

A Virtual Debate in Exile: Cassirer and the Vienna Circle after 1933

“…Indeed, in constituting the realm of Kulturwissenschaften, Cassirer may be seen as continuing -on a much broader and more detailed scale than Carnap -a project that the latter had already sketched in the Aufbau, to wit, the con stitution of "cultural objects" (cf. Aufbau ( § § 150ff) and Mormann 2006).…”

“…In the Aufbau he had still opted for a "comprehensive scientifi c philosophy" that dealt not only with empirical and formal sciences, but also sought to include a theory of Geistes wissenschaften dealing with cultural objects, in particular values (cf. Mormann (2006)). Around 1930, however, he began to favor a "restrictive scientifi c philosophy" according to which values and other cultural objects ceased to be respectable objects of study for scientifi c philosophy.…”