Werk

Autonomy and the concrete universal. Moral subjectivity and its function in Hegel’sPhilosophy of Right

“…Therefore spirit can be regarded as a ‘legislator’, and ‘[w]hat spirit legislates for itself are laws’ (Pippin 2008: 65). Although Hegel does not explicitly mention the concept of ‘autonomy’ very often in his Philosophy of Right , he nevertheless determines it even more concretely than Kant in this work (see Jaeschke 2010: 369).…”

“…In the ‘architecture’ of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right morality has the function of linking the rational universal with the individual will, with subjectivity. Therefore W. Jaeschke calls the sphere of morality ‘gleichsam die begriffliche Genese der “volonté générale” ’ (‘as it were the conceptual genesis of the volonté générale ’ – see Jaeschke 2010: 382). Without morality, there would not have been a consciousness of freedom in the modern sense, and hence also no free society or rational state in the modern sense, because they presuppose subjectivity.…”

“…According to Hegel’s logic of concept, the whole social world, and finally the political community of the state, must be regarded under the teleological perspective of the unfolded idea, therefore as a result of a development of rational categories (we are not talking here about the empirical world as such, of course, but about the social world as seen from a speculative, and that includes normative , perspective). This unfolded ‘realm of actualized freedom’ must be a social whole that has the form of a concrete universal, which is ‘an interpenetrating unity of universality and particularity’ (Neuhouser 2000: 49), in which the universal (the community) is mediated with the singular citizen (see Jaeschke 2010: 390-391). According to Hegel, this concrete universal has itself the structure of ‘subjectivity’ (as it is based on knowledge and rationality), and it also depends on the free subjectivity of its citizens and their voluntary identification with the rational universal.…”

“…And in morality, we must not look just for a simple subjective will which is just following its private insight, but for such a will which is oriented strictly towards the universality of reason, as Kant’s principle of the Categorical Imperative postulates. Therefore, ‘the good’ brings both sides together: the subjective will and the objective principle of reason (see Jaeschke 2010: 383-384). This union takes place in a subject whose relation to the good defines ‘the essential character’ of her will, who regards this strict orientation towards the good as her duty (PR: §133).…”

The AristotelianTheosin Hegel'sPhilosophy of Mind

“…Alfredo Ferrarin, for instance, does not even include a chapter on the absolute mind in his voluminous study, evidently following Hegel's Lectures on the Aristotelian philosophy of mind, which also ends with a discussion on politics. Tobias Dangel, who does briefly discuss absolute mind, does not comment on the last three paragraphs of the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind , while Walter Jaeschke (2010: 268–72), who reviews the ‘three syllogisms’, does not discuss the Aristotle quotation.…”