Were Kant's Hypothetical Imperatives Wide-Scope Oughts?

Rippon, Simon

doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.915576

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…7. See, e.g., Greenspan (1972), Hill (1973;, Darwall (1983), Schroeder (2005;2015), Siyar (2013), and Rippon (2014).…”

Section: The Normative Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…18 To see why it has such an implication, recall that IP-Wide is a requirement applying to all agents, irrespective of their particular desires or ends: all rational agents, regardless of their contingent ends, are required to satisfy 17. See Brunero and Kolodny (2013) and Rippon (2014) for other independent problems for Sophisticated IP-Narrow.…”

Section: Ip-wide and The Problem Of False Categoricitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In response to the problem of no subject, Rippon (2014) concedes that it is hard to make sense of IP-Wide as an analysis of the concept of willing, but argues that we need not narrowly restrict ourselves to the subject-predicate conception of analyticity. According to the alternative view of analyticity he attributes to Kant, "a claim is analytic just if its negation would be a contradiction when its conceptual containments are fully spelled out" (Rippon 2014: 787).…”

Section: Ip-wide and The Problem Of No Subject (Or No Predicate)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant

Lee¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…7. See, e.g., Greenspan (1972), Hill (1973;, Darwall (1983), Schroeder (2005;2015), Siyar (2013), and Rippon (2014).…”

Section: The Normative Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ip-wide and The Problem Of False Categoricitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ip-wide and The Problem Of No Subject (Or No Predicate)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant

Lee¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…One of the current interpretative dilemmas is whether to apply a wide reading and take the hypothetical imperative as instructing agents on whether to have or not to have certain ends, or to apply a narrower reading according to which agents are only instructed to recognize the necessity of certain means once particular ends have been established. See more inSchroeder 2005 andRippon 2014. 9 On some of the grounds for having moral duty to vote see e.g : Guerrero 2010, Beerbohm 2012and Zakaras 2018.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

From deliberation to participation: Democratic commitments and the paradox of voting

Soc

2022

Filoz drus

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In this paper, I examine the view that, surprisingly, the more citizens deliberate about politics, the less likely they are to participate in the realm of the political, and vice versa. In the first part of the paper, I approach the problem from the perspective of the paradox of voting, the claim that voting itself is instrumentally irrational because of the very low probability that a single vote will make any difference at the elections. In the second part of the paper, I argue that rather than analyzing voting instrumentally, it is better to view it as part of the civic commitments that constitute what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society. The act of voting is not primarily an individual?s attempt to decisively influence any particular outcome, but an affirmation of the key practice that upholds the democratic society in which citizens play a part. This reveals a meta-paradox of voting. Namely, to not vote is to exhibit a type of behavior that implies acceptance of democracy simultaneously with rejecting its defining component. Because of that, I will claim, not voting is itself irrational. In light of that conclusion, in the third part of the paper, I explore the extant divide between deliberation and participation by referring back to the analysis of civic commitments. Whereas participation without deliberating reveals ideological bias, deliberation without participation expresses a lack of understanding of what it means to be a citizen. The way to connect them is to engage in a process of attaining reflective equilibrium between the two, starting from the practice of deliberation that would be fully informed by the awareness of our democratic commitments and disconnected from ideologically motivated participation.

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Deriving Positive Duties from Kant's Formula of Universal Law

Duindam

2023

History of Philosophy Quarterly

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According to the objection from positive duties, Kant's Formula of Universal Law is flawed because it cannot be used to derive any affirmative moral requirements. This paper offers a response to that objection and proposes a novel way to derive positive duties from Kant's formula. The Formula of Universal Law yields positive duties to adopt our own perfection and others’ happiness as ends because we could not rationally fail to will those ends as universal ends.

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Were Kant's Hypothetical Imperatives Wide-Scope Oughts?

Cited by 3 publications

References 2 publications

Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant

Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant

From deliberation to participation: Democratic commitments and the paradox of voting

Deriving Positive Duties from Kant's Formula of Universal Law

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