Well‐Being

Tiberius, Valerie; Plakias, Alexandra

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0013

Cited by 57 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…Caring about a worthwhile life need not amount to just wanting a happy life or a life of satisfaction. Tiberius and Plakias make the case for “value‐based life‐satisfaction” that can accommodate the idea that and agent's well‐being can be guided by values (2010).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Moral Value of Envy

Thomason¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life.

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confidence: 99%

The Moral Value of Envy

Thomason¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…The era of logical positivism would be an example. In our own time, moreover, which seems willing to take objective notions of well-being more seriously [see, e.g., Tiberius and Plakias 2012], philosophical interest in wisdom has likewise enjoyed a revival.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wisdom

Grimm

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…Positive psychology is a field of many constructs, and its journals are filled with debates over which should be used. These debates frequently turn on tacit assumptions about which constructs better capture the true nature of well-being (Gruber et al, 2011;Kashdan et al, 2008;Raibley, 2012Raibley, , 2012Ryff, 1989;Tiberius & Plakias, 2010;Waterman, 2008).…”

Section: Implicit Evaluative Commitmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Positive psychology is value-laden—It’s time to embrace it

Prinzing

2020

The Journal of Positive Psychology

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Evaluative claims and assumptions are ubiquitous in positive psychology. Some will deny this. But such disavowals are belied by the literature. Some will consider the presence of evaluative claims a problem and hope to root them out. But this is a mistake. If positive psychology is to live up to its raison d'être-to be the scientific study of the psychological components of human flourishing or well-being-it must make evaluative claims. Well-being consists in those things that are good for us, that make life go well. Thus, one cannot investigate this topic without making claims about what is good for people and what they have reason to do. It's time, therefore, to embrace the fact that positive psychology is value-laden. Doing so would benefit the field by allowing for more rigorous theorizing, and-perhaps counterintuitively-increasing the field's objectivity.

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Well‐Being

Cited by 57 publications

References 0 publications

The Moral Value of Envy

The Moral Value of Envy

Wisdom

Positive psychology is value-laden—It’s time to embrace it

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