Welfare institutions and the mobilization of consent: Union responses to labour market activation policies in France and the Netherlands

Abstract

Trade union responses to labour market activation policies are central to any assessment of their attitudes and strategies in the face of contemporary welfare state restructuring. Yet this issue has to date been the object of only limited theorization and minimal empirical investigation. We attempt to remedy this. Drawing on existing literatures in different disciplines, we first outline the theoretical grounds for predicting union opposition to or support for labour market activation measures. We then explore these competing arguments through a reconstruction and comparison of the development of union positions on labour market activation over time in two countries, France and the Netherlands. The case studies suggest that union stances on these policies are not straightforwardly determined by the structure of labour market institutions; considerations regarding the impact of activation initiatives on the role of unions in the institutions of the welfare state play a major role in mobilizing their consent or dissent.

The politics of in-work benefits: The case of the ‘active income of solidarity’ in France

“…This shift is apparent in the area of unemployment benefit insurance. Whereas reforms of unemployment benefit systems have traditionally sheltered full-time permanent workers at the expense of those on more precarious contracts, the 2009 reform of unemployment benefits reduced the required contribution period from 6 to 4 months (Clegg and Van Wijnbergen, 2011).…”

The partisan politics of institutional welfare state reform

“…In the decision-making process institutional benefits may, for instance, be traded for policy benefits (cf. Clegg and van Wijnbergen 2011). But governments may also explicitly choose to rely on institutional strategies to avoid the electoral spectacle typically associated with policy reforms, and/or circumvent other reform obstacles in the political system (Hacker 2004).…”

Unravelling the Politics of Activation Reforms: Exploring the Unusual Israeli Trajectory

“…However, due to bipartite self‐regulation ( paritaire ), French unions were able to maintain political influence beyond the strength of their membership and finances (Lallement : 67). Unions were also able to resist changes in the administration of unemployment benefits and the activation of the insured unemployed while supporting the activation of the recipients of various social assistance benefits (Clegg ; Clegg and van Wijnbergen ; Palier ). In the first decade of the new millennium (due to changes in the position of the French employers’ association), French unions slowly changed their stance towards the activation of the insured unemployed, and activation measures were introduced in unemployment insurance.…”