Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

Bullinger, Martin; Suksompong, Warut; Voudouris, Alexandros A.

doi:10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16661

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…It should be noted that Lemmas 2 and 3 also contrast many other models where outputs maximizing social welfare are stable for symmetric utilities [11,6,15].…”

Section: Structural Properties Of Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Ganian¹,

Hamm²,

Knop³

et al. 2023

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u s depends on a generic scoring vector s, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario.As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u s . We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u s or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.

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“…It should be noted that Lemmas 2 and 3 also contrast many other models where outputs maximizing social welfare are stable for symmetric utilities [11,6,15].…”

Section: Structural Properties Of Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Ganian¹,

Hamm²,

Knop³

et al. 2023

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In addition, a recent series of work considers deviation dynamics for hedonic games, which constitute another time-dependent model of coalition formation (see, e.g., Bilò et al 2018;Brandt, Bullinger, and Wilczynski 2023;Carosi, Monaco, and Moscardelli 2019). In particular, ASHGs and close variants are studied in depth (Bilò, Monaco, and Moscardelli 2022;Boehmer, Bullinger, and Kerkmann 2023;Brandt, Bullinger, and Tappe 2022;Bullinger and Suksompong 2023).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stability in Online Coalition Formation

Bullinger,

Romen

2024

AAAI

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Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where agents arrive in sequence and whenever an agent arrives, they have to be assigned to a coalition immediately and irrevocably. The scarce existing literature on online coalition formation has focused on the objective of maximizing social welfare, a demanding requirement, even in the offline setting. Instead, we seek to achieve stable coalition structures in an online setting, and focus on stability concepts based on deviations by single agents. We present a comprehensive picture in additively separable hedonic games, leading to dichotomies, where positive results are obtained by deterministic algorithms and negative results even hold for randomized algorithms.

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Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

Bullinger

Suksompong

Voudouris

2021

jair

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Schelling’s model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect to several welfare measures. First, we show that while maximizing the social welfare is NP-hard, computing an assignment of agents to the nodes of any topology graph with approximately half of the maximum welfare can be done in polynomial time. We then consider Pareto optimality, introduce two new optimality notions based on it, and establish mostly tight bounds on the worst-case welfare loss for assignments satisfying these notions as well as the complexity of computing such assignments. In addition, we show that for tree topologies, it is possible to decide whether there exists an assignment that gives every agent a positive utility in polynomial time; moreover, when every node in the topology has degree at least 2, such an assignment always exists and can be found efficiently.

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Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

Cited by 3 publications

References 19 publications

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Stability in Online Coalition Formation

Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation

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