Welfare conditionality, benefit sanctions and homelessness in the UK: ending the ‘something for nothing culture’ or punishing the poor?

Abstract

In 2012 the UK government introduced the harshest regime of conditionality and sanctions in the history of the benefits system. The government insists sanctions are not punitive, but critics call this into question. In particular, the regime has been charged with disproportionately affecting vulnerable people. Based on a survey and qualitative interviews with homeless people, this paper shows that homeless people are disproportionately sanctioned, and argues that it is difficult to see the regime as anything but punishment — punishment not for refusing to participate in the labour market, but for being unable to do so through homelessness, poverty and ill-health.

Welfare Conditionality in Lived Experience: Aggregating Qualitative Longitudinal Research

“…These findings present a major challenge to the thinking behind UK welfare conditionality and are particularly important in generating new insight into the impact of the post-2010 punitive turn (Heins & Bennet, 2018). While lived experiences of conditionality depart greatly from the popular representation of this policy mechanism (Manji, 2017;Reeve, 2017), it remains an incredibly dominant and powerful misrepresentation with great purchase. Policymakers continue to press for conditionality despite evidence of its ineffectiveness in enabling transitions from 'welfare' into 'work' (and since 2013, with the advent of in-work Universal Credit conditionality, from 'work' into more 'work').…”

“…A distinctive feature of this turn (under-recognised internationally) is that the demandingness of British benefit eligibility is not confined to unemployed people, but includes lone parents and disabled people (Heins and Bennett, 2018;Patrick, 2011;Manji, 2017;Whitworth and Griggs, 2013). The 2012 sanctions regime introduced open-ended penalties and fixed periods of up to three years without benefits (Adler, 2016;Reeve, 2017;Reeves and Loopstra, 2017) for those who 'serially and deliberately breach their most important requirements' (DWP, 2012).…”

Punitive benefit sanctions, welfare conditionality, and the social abuse of unemployed people in Britain: Transforming claimants into offenders?

“…Fording, Schram, & Soss, 2013). Sanctioned claimants are more likely to be disadvantaged, for example, homeless (Reeve, 2017), than those who are not sanctioned and genuine barriers to employment, rather than resistance, often prevent compliance with requirements (Hasenfeld, Ghose, & Larson, 2004). Wheelock, Wald, & Shchukin, (2012, p. 1) show that in the United States, "racial attitudes seemingly link support for punitive approaches to opposition to welfare expenditure."…”

“…Fording, Schram, & Soss, ). Sanctioned claimants are more likely to be disadvantaged, for example, homeless (Reeve, ), than those who are not sanctioned and genuine barriers to employment, rather than resistance, often prevent compliance with requirements (Hasenfeld, Ghose, & Larson, ). Wheelock, Wald, & Shchukin, (, p. 1) show that in the United States, “racial attitudes seemingly link support for punitive approaches to opposition to welfare expenditure.” In welfare settings ranging from work‐first English‐speaking systems to human‐capital Nordic regimes, sanction rates are influenced by external pressures like targets and benchmarking and local organisational practices, with limited caseworker discretion at street level (ibid.…”

Intensity, moderation, and the pressures of expectation: Calculation and coercion in the street‐level practice of welfare conditionality

“…Despite the overtly moralistic tone of political discourse surrounding behavioral welfare reform (Garthwaite, 2011;Jensen & Tyler, 2015;Patrick, 2016;Wiggan, 2012), the meaning and import of behavioral conditionality for street-level practice have received less attention. Given that the individualized, moralized, and coercive character of welfare conditionality is often central to citizens' experiences of welfare reform (Flint, 2019;Friedli & Stearn, 2015;Garthwaite, 2014;Patrick, 2017;Reeve, 2017;Wright, 2016), it is important to understand the role of street-level practitioners in producing these relations and experiences.…”