Weighing and Balancing in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

Abstract

Abstract:In legal theory, it is widely claimed that decisions in hard cases are based on weighing and balancing. However no reconstructions are given of the deep structure of the complex argumenation underlying the justification of these decisions. The author develops a model for the analysis of weighing and balancing of arguments in the justification of judicial decisions that are based on teleological-evaluative considerations. The justification is reconstructed as a complex argumentation that consists of different levels of argumentation and it is explained how these levels of argumentation relate to the burden of proof of a judge who gives a decision that is based on a weighing and balancing in which teleological-evaluative considerations are invoked.Résumé: Il est largement accepté dans la théorie du droit que les décisions dans les procès difficiles se fondent sur un balancement d'arguments opposés. Toutefois on ne donne aucune reconstruction de la structure profonde de l'argumentation complexe qui sous-tend la justification des ces décisions. L'auteur développe une approche fondée sur les réflexions d'une évaluation téléologique pour analyser le balancement des arguments qui justifient les décisions judi-ciaires. La justification est reconstruite comme une argumentation complexe à différents niveaux, et on explique comment ces niveaux d'argumentation se relient à la charge de preuve d'un juge qui donne une décision fondée sur un ba-lancement dans lequel il invoque des réflexions d'évaluations téléologiques.

Solving a Murder Case by Asking Critical Questions: An Approach to Fact-Finding in Terms of Argumentation and Story Schemes

“…We have shown how two kinds of general knowledge about the world play a role: (1) defeasible argumentation schemes that specify which kinds of reasons support which kinds of conclusions (such as the witness testimony scheme), and (2) story schemes that specify which clusters of facts and events are plausible Footnote 32 continued reasons must be weighed. See also Wellman (1971), Naess (1978), Govier (1999), Feteris (2008), Hage (1996Hage ( , 1997, Verheij (1996). The debate on the weighing of reasons has recently been revived by the Symposium on Conductive Arguments, organized at University of Windsor in 2010 (about which a special issue of the journal Informal Logic is in preparation).…”

Using event progression to enhance purposive argumentation in the value judgment formalism

“…For prior work in legal theory on consequences and their relevance to values, see [15]. Related argument schemes can also be found in [10], where taking certain actions at different stages in a transition network promotes or demotes certain values and works towards a certain goal.…”