2013
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-013-9474-z
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Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games

Abstract: Abstract. Weakly-acyclic games -a superclass of potential gamescapture distributed environments where simple, globally-asynchronous interactions between strategic agents are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We explore the class of routing games in [4,12], which models important aspects of routing on the Internet. We show that, in interesting contexts, such routing games are weakly acyclic and, moreover, that pure Nash equilibria in such games can be found in a computationally efficient manner.

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Cited by 7 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 15 publications
(5 reference statements)
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“…[22] and independently [27] observed that the operation of the BGP can be viewed as a best response dynamics in a natural class of routing games and finite improvement paths that terminate in Nash equilibria essentially translate to stable routing states. Following this observation the already mentioned [19] presented a game theoretic analysis of routing on the Internet in presence of 'misbehaving players' or backup edges.…”
Section: Potential Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 87%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…[22] and independently [27] observed that the operation of the BGP can be viewed as a best response dynamics in a natural class of routing games and finite improvement paths that terminate in Nash equilibria essentially translate to stable routing states. Following this observation the already mentioned [19] presented a game theoretic analysis of routing on the Internet in presence of 'misbehaving players' or backup edges.…”
Section: Potential Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Weak acyclicity of a game also ensures that certain modifications of the traditional no-regret algorithm yield an almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium [35]. [18] and more fully [19] showed that specific Internet routing games are weakly acyclic. In turn, [32] established that certain classes of network creation games are weakly acyclic and moreover that a specific scheduling of players can ensure that the resulting improvement path converges to a Nash equilibrium in O(n log n) steps.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To circumvent this problem, in the following we replace the concept of best-response, with the milder notion of better response [42]:…”
Section: Global Energy Efficiency Maximization Without Minimum Rmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, the goal is just to find a strategy p * k which increases u k compared to the present strategy p k , and given the strategies of the other players p −k . This introduces the notion of better-response dynamics [42]:…”
Section: Global Energy Efficiency Maximization Without Minimum Rmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation