Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes

Lee, Dong-Ryul

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.11.003

Cited by 73 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Similar behaviour is predicted for the CES impact function [101,134]. In the case of weak-link contests, analysis predicts multiple equilibria including those with no free-riding at all [135]. In best-shot contests, there can be 'perverse equilibria' in which the highest valuation players completely free-ride on others by exerting no effort [132].…”

Section: (I) Homogeneous Groupsmentioning

confidence: 71%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

114

133

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

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Section: (I) Homogeneous Groupsmentioning

confidence: 71%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

114

133

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“…Since this game is a coordination game, there exist multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which the players within the same group match their efforts at the same level while best responding to the effort of the other group (Sheremeta, 2011;Lee, 2012). In particular, in any equilibrium, all players in each group best respond to the effort of the other group according to the following best-response functions:…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason

Sheremeta

Zhang

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

150

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Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency. This contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes. JEL Classifications: C70, D72, H41

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“…the members of the smaller group. Finally, substituting (8) and (9) into (3), individual welfare in the symmetric equilibrium is given, for j = A; B and j 6 = k; by…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lee (2012) considers weakest-link contests for group-speci…c public prizes, while Chowdhury and al. (2013) take the other extreme by considering best-shot group contests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%