Weaker Presidents, Better Semi-presidentialism?

Elgie, Robert; Moestrup, Sophia

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-38781-3_8

Cited by 3 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…There is no generally accepted definition and consensus on how to measure the authority of presidents. However, one of the most popular approaches in comparative politics are the socalled Presidential Power Indices (PPI) that offer a more fine-grained instrument with which to capture variation than the literature on the system of government typologies of presidential and semi-presidential types (Elgie 2016;Elgie and Moestrup 2016;Fruhstorfer 2016). The number of indices to be found in the literature is quite large (among the most prominent are Shugart and Carey 1992;McGregor 1994;Frye 1997;Metcalf 2000;Roper 2002;Siaroff 2003).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Burkhardt

2017

Post-Soviet Affairs

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What role do formal institutions play in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes such as the Russian Federation? Oftentimes, it is assumed that autocrats, usually potent presidents, wield informal powers and control far flung patron-client networks that undermine formal institutions and bolster their rule. After the institutional turn in authoritarianism studies, elections, parties, legislatures, or courts have taken center stage, yet presidencies and public law are still on the margins of this research paradigm. This paper proposes a method for measuring subconstitutional presidential power and its change by federal law, decrees, and Constitutional Court rulings as well as a theoretical framework for explaining when and under which conditions subconstitutional presidential power expands. It is argued that as a result of a gradual, small-scale, and slow-moving process of layering, presidential powers have been accumulated over time. This furthers the institutionalization of presidential advantage toward other federal and regional institutions, which in turn contributes to the consolidation of authoritarianism.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Burkhardt

2017

Post-Soviet Affairs

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“…Since then, studies focused on defining, classifying, and comparing the various forms of government have increased and diversified. Although a considerable amount of research has been carried out in this field, most of it has focused on a specific continent, region, or country or made a comparison of the different forms (see Carey, 2005; Cheibub et al, 2011; Elgie, 1999; Elgie and Moestrup, 2016; Hloušek, 2014; Lijphart, 1985; Mainwaring, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main identifiers of the presidential form are as follows: The executive is unified (Lijphart, 2012: 106–107; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 449; Siaroff, 2003: 288; Verney, 1959: 46). The president is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote (Gerring et al, 2009: 337; Lijphart, 1992: 2–3, 2012: 17, 106–107; Linz, 1990a: 52; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 449; Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 4; Sartori, 1994: 106; Shugart, 2005: 325; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19). The president is both head of state and head of government (Lijphart, 2012: 106–107; Linz, 1990a: 52; Sartori, 1994: 106; Verney, 1959: 45). The president unilaterally appoints the ministers (Linz, 1990a: 52; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 449; Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 330; Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 4; Shugart, 2005: 325; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19; Verney, 1959: 45). The appointment of ministers by the president alludes to the following possibilities: Ministers are only responsible to the president (Linz, 1990a: 52; Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 330). The government is not collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie and Moestrup, 2016: 7; Lijphart, 2012: 106–107; Shugart, 2005: 325). The president’s term of office is fixed (Elgie and Moestrup, 2016: 7; Gerring et al, 2009: 337; Lijphart, 1992: 2–3, 1999: 17, 2008: 142, 2012: 106; Linz, 1990a: 52; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 449; Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 330; Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 4; Sartori, 1994: 106; Shugart, 2005: 325; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19; Skach, 2005: 13; Stepan and Skach, 1993: 3–4; Verney, 1959: 51). Fixed-term presidency also means: The president is not responsible to the legislature (Cheibub, 2007: 15; Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 4; …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The president unilaterally appoints the ministers (Linz, 1990a: 52; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997: 449; Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 330; Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 4; Shugart, 2005: 325; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19; Verney, 1959: 45). The appointment of ministers by the president alludes to the following possibilities: Ministers are only responsible to the president (Linz, 1990a: 52; Munkh-Erdene, 2010: 330). The government is not collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie and Moestrup, 2016: 7; Lijphart, 2012: 106–107; Shugart, 2005: 325). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Classifying forms of government on a global scale

Metin

ÜNAL>

2022

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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This study classifies the forms of government present in all the countries worldwide. We examined the constitutions of 195 countries and prepared a template that allows us to determine the form of government of any given country. The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we support Shugart and Carey’s claim that the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential forms are main types in themselves and not subtypes of semi-presidentialism. Second, based on some fundamental differences, we divided the assembly-government form into two subtypes, namely assembly-independent and assembly-dependent, the latter being introduced as a new subtype. The third significant contribution is to coin a new form of government named semi-monarchial, which is positioned between parliamentary and monarchy forms. Lastly, the study reveals that the most preferred form in the world is parliamentary (57), followed by presidential (43), premier-presidential (31), president-parliamentary (28), assembly-government (13), semi-monarchial (8), and monarchy (4).

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“…In other words, institutional effects are likely "to be the expression of the preferences that were hardwired into institutional structures at the time they were chosen". 41 Since the aim of our analysis is to reveal general patterns with regard to the four regime types and their performance outcomes, our analysis can only make very modest claims about causal effects. Nevertheless, our theoretically derived hypotheses embrace the assumption that institutions matter and that there is an interplay between various constitutional forms and the political actors who interpret those forms.…”

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confidence: 99%

Unravelling semi-presidentialism: democracy and government performance in four distinct regime types

Sedelius

Linde

2017

Democratization

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Do semi-presidential regimes perform worse than other regime types? Semipresidentialism has become a preferred choice among constitution makers worldwide. The semi-presidential category contains anything but a coherent set of regimes, however. We need to separate between its two subtypes, premierpresidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Following Linz's argument that presidentialism and semi-presidentialism are less conducive to democracy than parliamentarism a number of studies have empirically analysed the functioning and performance of semi-presidentialism. However, these studies have investigated the performance of semi-presidential subtypes in isolation from other constitutional regimes. By using indicators on regime performance and democracy, the aim of this study is to examine the performance of premier-presidential and presidentparliamentary regimes in relation to parliamentarism and presidentialism. Premierpresidential regimes show performance records on a par with parliamentarism and on some measures even better. President-parliamentary regimes, on the contrary, perform worse than all other regime types on most of our included measures. The results of this novel study provide a strong call to constitution makers to stay away from president-parliamentarism as well as against the idea of thinking about semipresidentialism as a single and coherent type of regime.

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Weaker Presidents, Better Semi-presidentialism?

Cited by 3 publications

References 7 publications

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

The institutionalization of relative advantage: formal institutions, subconstitutional presidential powers, and the rise of authoritarian politics in Russia, 1994–2012

Classifying forms of government on a global scale

Unravelling semi-presidentialism: democracy and government performance in four distinct regime types

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