Weakening Parliamentary Oversight, Increasing Corruption: Ghana

Draman, Rasheed

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_3

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Because ministers are appointed by the executive, and because the majority party in the legislature and the executive have traditionally come from the same party, the loyalty of ruling political elites is primarily to the executive (president) and the party. Increased levels of partisanship have strengthened party cohesion and an unwillingness by ruling parties to weaken the executive (Dramman, 2017). As a result, there is little interest by ruling parties to negotiate with minority parties to change the existing political status quo.…”

Section: Pro-democratic Lawfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, there are aspects of fusion of the executive and legislature through cabinet appointments,² which undermine the legislature's independent oversight of the executive branch of government (Center for Democratic Development- Ghana, 2008). Dramman (2017) argues that parliament has become weaker since around 2009 in its oversight of the executive due to increased partisanship, which has created high levels of party cohesion and an unwillingness to censure either serving ministers or the executive. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that over the years the executive and the legislature are controlled by the same party and, with high levels of party cohesion, there is little desire by the ruling party to negotiate democratic reforms with the political opposition.…”

Section: Judicial Lawfare: Resisting Constitutional Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

2022

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Why have most African countries not achieved greater political liberalization? What explains the lack of progress toward the ideals of liberal democracy across the region? This book advances ongoing debates on democratic backsliding with specific reference to Africa. In examining how incumbent leaders in African countries attempt to contain societal pressures for greater democracy, the chapters explain how governments go beyond the standard tools of manipulation, such as electoral fraud and political violence, to keep democracy from unfolding in their countries. The book emphasizes two distinct strategies that governments frequently use to reinforce their hold on power, but which remain overlooked in conventional analyses; —the legal system and the international system. It—documents how governments employ the law to limit the scope of action among citizens and civil society activists struggling to expand democratic liberties, including the use of constitutional provisions and the courts. The work further demonstrates how governments use their role in international relations to neutralize pressure from external actors, including sovereigntist claims against foreign intervention and selective implementation of donor-promoted policies. While pro-democracy actors can also employ these legal and international strategies to challenge incumbents, in some cases to prevent democratic backsliding, the book shows why and how incumbents have enjoyed institutional advantages when implementing these strategies through the six country case studies of Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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Section: Pro-democratic Lawfarementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Judicial Lawfare: Resisting Constitutional Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

2022

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“…One critical element of this is the independence of the oversight process itself, and the extent to which this function is intended to ground-truth reports from the executive, or simply review them. Many people look at political interference as a threat to independent oversight (Draman, 2020); the vignette below reminds us that it is also important to highlight the way seemingly administrative processes of budgeting within the support wing of parliament can also shape the independence of oversight.…”

Section: Findings: Evaluative Practice By Parliamentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From evidence to values-based decision making in African parliaments

Mapitsa

Ali

Khumalo

2020

Evaluation Journal of Australasia

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Monitoring and Evaluation discourse in Africa has evolved to focus on building systems at a national level. While this systemic approach has many advantages, its implementation often runs up against the uncomfortable reality that governments have complex incentives to use evidence, and this evidence can equally contribute to decision making that is neither development-focused nor democratic if values are not part of the conversation. Much of the literature on public-sector reform focuses on evidence-based policy making. While relevant, it does not reflect on values, and this article will argue that acknowledging the central role values play in interpreting evidence is critical to effective national evaluation system building. To make this argument, this article will present and discuss vignettes from the parliaments of Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe that illustrate the pivotal role values have played in interpreting and acting on evidence in a parliamentary context. Finally, it makes a case for the discourse about evidence-based policy making to consider values-based policy making as an appropriate lens for parliaments to acknowledge and engage with the complex landscape of the politics of evidence.

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“…Both Lindberg and Zhou (2009) and Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2012) highlighted Ghana's democratization as one of the political success stories in Africa. At the same time, however, its legislative power is weak and possibly becoming weaker (Draman 2018). Conversely, Rwanda has a low score regarding political freedom but a relatively high score in terms of legislative power-reflecting perhaps President Kagame's tight control of power but encouragement of policy debate within parliament.…”

Section: John Ishiyama University Of North Texas Usamentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy, Legislatures, and Business Conditions in Post-Authoritarian African Regimes

Stapenhurst

Côté

2018

APSC

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Bangladeshi citizens enjoyed a competitive, multiparty political system with regularly contested elections. Despite serious weaknesses of other democratic institutions-including the Election Commission; a trust deficit among major political parties particularly among two major parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL); and repeated episodes of political violence-free and fair elections in regular Bangladesh embraced parliamentary democracy in 1991, after a short-lived one-party authoritarian system in 1975 and 15 years of military and pseudo-civilian rule. However, by 2018, it is an example of how an enfeebled legislative body can become a tool of the executive in its authoritarian agenda. the parliament to impeach Supreme Court judges. When the High Court and the Supreme Court annulled the amendment (2017), the ruling party engaged in the vilification of the Chief Justice, who later "resigned" and left the country. Bangladesh's experience since 2009, particularly two constitutional amendments, shows how a hybrid regime utilized the legislature as a tool for strengthening its authoritarian tendencies. n

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Weakening Parliamentary Oversight, Increasing Corruption: Ghana

Cited by 3 publications

References 3 publications

Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

From evidence to values-based decision making in African parliaments

Democracy, Legislatures, and Business Conditions in Post-Authoritarian African Regimes

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