Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition

Abstract

We develop a theory of the accumulation of state capacity as the outcome of a political competition between elites and (civil) society. State capacity is accumulated by elites, and it is productive as well as useful in controlling society. However, society can fight back and accumulate its own capacity, facilitating collective action. The theory leads to three distinct equilibria depending on initial conditions. One type, a weak state, emerges when society is strong relative to the elite. Another, a despotic state, originates where the elite is initially relatively powerful. A third type, an inclusive state, emerges when the elite and society are more evenly matched. The theory has several important implications; first, variation in state capacity does not require large structural differences; second, inclusive states have the highest levels of state capacity in the long run; third, the effects of shocks or external threats like wars are conditional on the balance of power between elites and society.

Governance and Economic Growth in Afghanistan during the Era of US presence

“…Furthermore, the effectiveness of government has a direct impact on society's well-being (Helliwell, Huang, Grover, & Wang, 2018). To promote prosperity and prevent resource extraction by political elites, inclusive governance upholds the balance of power between the state and society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2023). The empirical research demonstrate that the correlation between governance variables and economic development varies statistically by nation.…”

“…According to Tsani (2013), the quality of governance and institutions affect society's resource distribution. Society with good governance promote the economic growth, while disqualify governance led to extract the nations resource by political elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2023). Furthermore, the effectiveness of government has a direct impact on society's well-being (Helliwell, Huang, Grover, & Wang, 2018).…”

The Political U: New Evidence on Democracy and Income

“…They develop an analytical framework in which in democracy elites have incentives to invest a significant amount of resources to influence, and then capture, the state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2022) explain the accumulation of state capacity as the outcome of a political competition between elites and civil society leading to three different equilibria: despotic, weak and inclusive states.…”

“…And Acemoglu and Robinson (2022) explain state capacity as the outcome of political competition between elites and civil society that lead to three different equilibria: despotic, weak and inclusive states. This theoretical literature characterizes intermediate regimes by their relatively higher levels of instability.…”