“We Embraced Each Other by Our Names”: Levinas, Derrida, and the Ethics of Naming

Moraru, Christian

doi:10.1179/nam.2000.48.1.49

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Most important to this study is how personal and family names correspond to the establishment of identity. Aldrin (2016) asserted that “naming is always a question of assigning identity” (p. 382), and as Moraru (2000) briefly sketched in certain contexts like the Yugoslav wars, names are identities. In less extreme cases, Bodenhorn and Vom Bruck (2006) noted that names are a recognition of personhood, defined as our “conceptions of what persons are and how we should understand and act toward them” (Rose, 1998, p. 11).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Is Worthy of a Name? Identity, Naming, and Social Difference in News Images’ Captions

Scott,

Peña

2023

Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly

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This study examined news images and captions published by The Associated Press ( N = 7,455) between 2018 and 2022 to ascertain whether names were more frequently included for certain groups of people. The analysis found that people depicted in the Global North are named far more frequently than in the Global South, and that sports, entertainment, and political images include names more often than news and feature images. These pervasive patterns suggest naming has a discursive function that constructs an Other by excluding familial and cultural connotations inherent in names, forming a hierarchy through opposition, and extending social prominence for certain groups.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Is Worthy of a Name? Identity, Naming, and Social Difference in News Images’ Captions

Scott,

Peña

2023

Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly

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“…Naming can also be "linked to our ability to comprehend the world around us" (Stump 1998, 8). It is described as "a process of discovery" (Bodenhorn and vom Bruck 2006, 3) or a means to embrace others (Moraru 2000). Anthropologists have often examined the process of naming as "a way of making connections between groups" (Humphrey 2006, 158).…”

Section: What Is In a Name?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The words one chooses to name can convey judgements beside carrying information. Moraru (2000), influenced by Derrida, looks at naming as a political act because names can "lay out a model of social behavior, of how we (should) treat others" (55). Drawing upon Althusser's theory of interpellation, Humphrey (2006) also refers to the political act of naming when human beings are seen as ideological subjects who "come into existence only by being named" (172) and are hailed or interpellated by those names in social interactions.…”

Section: The Necessity and Possibility Of Re-naming Oneselfmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Necessity / Possibility to Re‐name: A Spiritual Autoethnography

Rafi¹

2021

Anthropology and Humanism

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This article is a spiritual autoethnography that discusses the necessity and possibility of finding names for personal religious or spiritual beliefs. It investigates the multiple nature of selfhood, crossing boundaries, and shifting identities by relating the life story of the author from being born a Muslim to being an atheist, and then to becoming interested in religious mysticism and being a devoted spiritual traveler. By means of autoethnographic techniques, the article illustrates how people are urged to find new names for what they are specifically when they perform religious rules of a faith in a different way. The article also discusses the consequences of re-naming.[natural spirituality, Ostad Elahi, autoethnography, naming, re-naming] You'd Better Find a Name For What You Are!We were in a restaurant; it was a small get-together. My husband and a close friend of ours had their beers in front of them; my daughter and I had our smoothies. Our friend took a sip of his beer and closed his eyes to show how much he was enjoying it. Then he offered me a sip: "Try some! This is one of the most delicious beers in the world." The familiar sense of discomfort overtook me. "No, thanks!" I smiled in a friendly manner and tried to change the subject, but he insisted. I was becoming uncomfortable as I had a feeling that my personal space was being violated. Despite reminding myself that I did not have to explain, I told him that I did not drink alcoholic beverages. Satisfied, as if he was waiting for me to say the sentence, our friend leaned back and asked: "And why is that? Is it because you are a Muslim? Why don't you wear hijab then?" He continued with a short lecture, reviewing the rules of Islam and my conflicting religious choices, and firmly concluded: "You, definitely, are not a Muslim. You'd better find a name for what you are!" That was not the first time someone questioned and disputed my religious beliefs. Trying to manage contradictory ideologies in my mind, I had built a personal system of religious ideas that evaded definition. I always thought of my ideology as a "constant work in progress" because I was frequently modifying it. I was never comfortable discussing it with others because I did not

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Embodying “you”: Levinas and a question of the second person

Clarkson¹

2005

Jlse

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In this paper I examine the effects of considering Levinas's philosophy of the relation to the Other as a relation to a second person "you," rather than to a third person "he." To think of the Other as "you" sheds further light on the ethical encounter that Levinas terms the "Saying:" it provokes us to think of the event of reading a literary text as an event of the Saying. In the dynamic potential of the literary text to instantiate an "I" and a "you" (which is to say, an addresser and an addressee) each time it is read, and in ways that cannot be exhaustively predicted or epistemologically saturated in advance, the artwork effects an open yet responsive encounter with the Other. Embodying "you": Levinas and a question of the second personCARROL CLARKSON JLS 34 (2005), 95-105 0341-7638/05/034-95

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“We Embraced Each Other by Our Names”: Levinas, Derrida, and the Ethics of Naming

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Who Is Worthy of a Name? Identity, Naming, and Social Difference in News Images’ Captions

Who Is Worthy of a Name? Identity, Naming, and Social Difference in News Images’ Captions

The Necessity / Possibility to Re‐name: A Spiritual Autoethnography

Embodying “you”: Levinas and a question of the second person

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