`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts

Abstract

A key objection raised by terrorism scholars and policymakers against engaging in negotiations with terrorists is that it legitimizes terrorist groups, their goals and their means. Talking to them would serve only to incite more violence and weaken the fabric of democratic states, they argue. With the emergence of Al-Qaeda and its complex transnational structure, many have added another objection: Who does one talk to? Faced with such a multifaceted, horizontal organization, how does one engage? This article offers an alternative approach to the question of legitimacy and complexity in engaging with terrorism. Drawing from research in peace and conflict studies, it analyses how these two factors may in fact be conducive to a nonviolent resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence. Using the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the southern Philippine region of Mindanao as illustrations, the article argues that the legitimation of `terrorist' groups through talks can be a means to transform a conflict away from violence, while complexity may in fact open up new possibilities for engagement. The article concludes by examining how the naming of a group as `terrorist' can and is often designed to forestall nonviolent responses to terrorism.

“Listing terrorists”: the impact of proscription on third-party efforts to engage armed groups in peace processes – a practitioner's perspective

“…2. For a detailed discussion on legitimacy and complexity in engaging with terrorism, see Toros (2008).…”

“…On Chechnya, Russell (2005) explores how far the demonisation of the Chechens has become a major obstacle to peace. Similarly, Toros (2008) explores how the naming of a group as "terrorist" can forestall non-violent responses to terrorism.…”

Governments, publics, and enemies: Intragroup dynamics as barriers to conflict resolution

“…Even in circumstances in which leaders recognize that there might be benefits to seeking a negotiated agreement with a group that employs terrorist violence, public opposition may make it too politically costly for leaders to pursue such negotiations. During the conflict in Northern Ireland, for example, the British government adopted a public policy of refusing to negotiate with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Neumann, 2007;Toros, 2008); in the words of a spokesman for British Prime Minister Thatcher, "We do not negotiate with terrorists and have no intention of negotiating with the IRA or their political wing" (Longworth, 1990). In fact, the British Government, which had seen the potential utility of exploring a negotiated settlement with the IRA, had for years pursued secret, back-channel negotiations with the IRA.…”

Complete Edition: Third World / Global South

“…Facing this reality, we sought, in this investigation, to ally scientific literature to an array of other researches from foreign investigators that lean over this reality. (Bolaji 2010;Hoffman 1998;Hutchinson and O'Mallery 2007;Wardlaw 1982;Warren 2012;Toros 2008). This problem arises because it is not exact what terrorism is and according to whose perspectives.…”