We don’t need no explanation

Abstract

Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it's true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The "ontology-first" approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory's dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking.

Existence, really? Tacit disagreements about “existence” in disputes about group minds and corporate agents

“…18 Rupert uses the locution "in virtue of," instead of "are made true by." But, as observed above, this locution relates to the idea of truthmaking (Asay 2018).…”

“…Expressions such as "truthmakers," "is made true," entities existing "because of," or properties being ascribed to something "in virtue of," can all count as indicators of a truthmaker view of existence at work insofar as the truthmaking relation is understood as an explanatory relation (Asay 2018).…”

“…Likewise, internal disputes may arise among proponents of the truthmaker view. For example, the analysis of the truthmaking relation is a formidable venue for an internal dispute, not unlike arguments over "indispensability" and "explanatory value" among proponents of the theory-commitments view (Asay 2018). Furthermore, the logics of the truthmaking relationits reflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetryare contested (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015).…”

Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding

“…(Cf. Asay 2018.) The obtaining of [grass is green] entails that <grass is green> is true, and if [grass is green] did not obtain, <grass is green> would not be true.…”

“…See also Liggins 2012 for arguments that not all cases of grounding are cases of truthmaking. And see Daly 2005, Perrine 2015, and Asay 2018 for more general concerns about applying the idea of metaphysical explanation to truthmaking.…”