Ways of desiring mutual sympathy in Adam Smith's moral philosophy

McHugh, John

doi:10.1080/09608788.2016.1146654

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…2; Otteson 2002, ch. 2; McHugh 2016; Schwarze and Scott 2019). This is another way of saying that all human agents desire to be objects of approbation—the “agreeable and delightful” emotion that spectators feel when their sympathetic passions perfectly correspond with the sentiments of the agents ( TMS I.iii.1.2, p. 44; I.iii.1.footnote b, p. 46; see also I.i.3.1, p. 16).…”

Section: The Role Of Vanitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Adam Smith and the Wealth-Worshipping Spectator

Elazar¹

2023

J Hist Econ Thought

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What explains the ambition to get rich? Adam Smith is clear that commercial ambition, the passionate desire for great wealth, is not simply a desire to satisfy one’s material needs. His argument on what underlies it, however, is not obvious. I review three possibilities suggested by Smith’s work and the scholarly literature—vanity, the love of system, and the desire for tranquility—and conclude that none of them captures the underlying motive of commercial ambition. Instead, I argue that Smith understands commercial ambition as a misguided desire for excellence. Ambitious pursuers of wealth are driven by the desire to deserve and to enjoy recognition for their excellence, but their judgment of what is truly excellent is corrupted by the standards of a wealth-worshipping society. Instead of appealing to the moral standpoint of the impartial spectator, they construct in their minds and follow a corruptive moral guide: the wealth-worshipping spectator.

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Section: The Role Of Vanitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Adam Smith and the Wealth-Worshipping Spectator

Elazar¹

2023

J Hist Econ Thought

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“…If Bailey is right, this observation might in part support Smith's discussion of mutual sympathy, for people might desire mutual sympathy, and take pleasure in it, because, among other things, they have a need to be humanely understood. For an excellent discussion of mutual sympathy in Smith, see McHugh (2016). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to incorporate this dimension of Smith's thought.…”

Section: An Adam Smithian Account Of Humanity: the Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Adam Smithian Account of Humanity

Ben-Moshe

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, valuing my humanity, understood as (my awareness of) my perspective and the reasons determined from within it, entails valuing your humanity, understood as (your awareness of) your perspective and the reasons determined from within it. Given Korsgaard’s emphasis on the publicity of reasons in her argument for UHC, I also discuss the role of reasons in my account. I argue that the relative weights of (at least some of) an agent’s reasons are determined from within a shared evaluative point of view, namely, the standpoint of what Smith calls “the impartial spectator.” These reasons have normative authority over and constrain the agent’s private reasons, that is, those that are determined from within her own particular evaluative point of view.

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“…Also weighing in on this debate are James Otteson (2002) and John McHugh (2016). Otteson has done more than anyone else to emphasize the centrality of mutual sympathy to Smith's thought generally, thereby confirming Hume's observation that it is the “Hinge” on which his theory turned; while McHugh (2016) has done the most to explain why mutual sympathy is pleasing and how this helps explain our “sincere, motivating commitment” to morality.…”

Section: Sympathy In Hume and Smithmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smithian sympathy and the emergence of norms

Hankins

Thrasher

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Adam Smith's impartial spectator and David Hume's general point of view have much in common, as do their moral theories more generally. However, this paper argues that a distinctive feature of Smith's theory—the pleasure of mutual sympathy—allows Smith to better explain a number of important features of norms. In particular, it provides Smith with a more plausible mechanism for explaining how norms emerge, and offers him a richer set of resources for explaining both why we are attracted to norms and why norms are often characterized by local similarity and global diversity. Rather than merely being a matter of historical interest, though, this paper argues that this aspect of Smith's theory warrants attention from contemporary social scientists interested in the nature of norms, as well as from philosophers interested in how we might look to our sentiments to ground our normative practices.

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Ways of desiring mutual sympathy in Adam Smith's moral philosophy

Cited by 5 publications

References 19 publications

Adam Smith and the Wealth-Worshipping Spectator

Adam Smith and the Wealth-Worshipping Spectator

An Adam Smithian Account of Humanity

Smithian sympathy and the emergence of norms

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