Ways of Being a Mess: Distinguishing Heterogeneity from Pluralistic Eliminativism

Abstract

There are two forms of argument for eliminativism which ought to be distinguished, but which generally are not. One of these, heterogeneity eliminativism, starts from the claim that the extension of a given term is heterogeneous, that is, does not form a natural kind. The other, pluralistic eliminativism, starts from the claim that a term is ‘pluralistic’, demanding different precise definitions, measures, and generalizations in different specialist contexts of use. These two claims are related in various interesting ways, but it is nevertheless worth viewing these as two distinct forms of argument for eliminativism. They make different claims about the relevant terms, face different objections, and rely on different views about the requirements of good taxonomy. My aim in distinguishing between heterogeneity eliminativism and pluralistic eliminativism is to contribute to a much broader literature on kinds of and reasons for eliminativism, one which outstrips the concerns of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science alone. However, the taxonomies on which I am most immediately building are most closely tied to philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.