2013
DOI: 10.1111/ejed.12042
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Waves of (Dis)Satisfaction: Effects of the Numerus Clausus system in Portugal

Abstract: Access to higher education in Portugal is governed by a quota system (numerus clausus). The purpose of this article is to answer two questions: First, how does the numerus clausus system shape the demand for medical studies? Second, how do non‐enrolled medical candidates influence the global allocation system and generate waves of dissatisfaction? The results show that students who do not succeed in entering medicine register in other programmes, such as pharmacy, veterinary medicine and dental studies, genera… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…In Portugal, about half of the students do not enrol the course or the institution of their first choice, making this a complex situation. This is due to numerus clauses used by the Portuguese government, meaning that placements are the result of the average classifications of high school and national exams used to access higher education [1].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Portugal, about half of the students do not enrol the course or the institution of their first choice, making this a complex situation. This is due to numerus clauses used by the Portuguese government, meaning that placements are the result of the average classifications of high school and national exams used to access higher education [1].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Those who are not placed in their first preference may be admitted to the second-best alternatives. Therefore, top academic performers in secondary education have a better chance of being admitted to their first preference and students who are not placed in their first preference might be dissatisfied with the outcome of their application (Fonseca et al 2014). There are additional alternative positive discrimination admission regimes for a small percentage of places.…”
Section: Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to deal with the growing demand and with the objective of broadening access, the system was expanded through the foundation of new universities and polytechnics (public and private) in new locations, breaking the previously existing concentration, in only three locations: Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra. These apparent paradoxes show that a centralised regulation has not been capable of mitigating the unbalanced relation between supply and demand (Fonseca & Encarnação, 2012;Fonseca, Tavares, Sá, & Amaral, 2013;Teixeira, Fonseca, Amado, Sá, & Amaral, 2009). , 2013).…”
Section: Setting the Scenementioning
confidence: 99%