Water Resources Allocation in Transboundary River Based on Asymmetric Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower Game Model

Water resource disputes for Transboundary Rivers are frequent and critical issues among countries. The Kumgangsan Dam was constructed (in North Korea) in the Transboundary River (North Han river) that affects the water resources downstream (in South Korea) of the dam. The amount of water resource (e.g., streamflow, discharge) downstream of the Kumgangsan dam has decreased after the dam construction which might cause decreased hydroelectric power and water pollution in the downstream dams, especially during the dry season. Thus, this study analyzed the changes in the inflow into the Euiam Lake (North Han River) by the construction of the Kumgangsan Dam through hydrological modeling and examined the discharge of Chuncheon Dam (inflow into Euiam Lake) considering the flow control in the Kumgangsan Dam under the dry condition scenario. In addition, the changes of base flow during different seasons were analyzed because the majority of streamflow is contributed by the base flow during dry and drought seasons. As shown in the results, it was found that the discharge from the Kumgangsan Dam has a wide effect on the downstream dams located in South Korea. The inflow of downstream dams was significantly influenced by the discharge of the upstream dam, and the base flow was also affected by the decreased discharge of dams. Based on these findings, upstream dam managements should be carefully considered to maintain the water resource and aquatic ecosystem for the downstream dam watershed. Furthermore, the results of this study can be used as the preliminary information when discussing the problems of water allocation and flood prevention with North Korea.

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Reduced Flow on Downstream Water Systems Due to the Kumgangsan Dam under Dry Conditions

Lee

et al. 2019

“…Nash-Harsanyi bargaining theory [28,29] can be used to provide fair and efficient resources allocation for players with guaranteed rational individual benefits [30][31][32][33]. Due to the increased hydropower generation of the whole system through coordination, the individual hydropower generation can be reallocated by Nash-Harsanyi bargaining theory to ensure the rational individual benefits [15].…”

Section: Benefits Compensation Model (Model Iii(b))mentioning

confidence: 99%

Qualifying Coordination Mechanism for Cascade-Reservoir Operation with a New Game-Theoretical Methodology

Xu¹,

Fu²,

Qin³

2018

The coordinated operation for hydropower generation in cascade reservoirs is critical to resolve the conflicts in hydropower needs between upstream and downstream reservoirs. Due to the individual rationality and collective rationality highlighted by game theory, we propose an integrated game-theoretical model to simulate the coordination behaviors among cascade reservoirs for hydropower generation. In the case study of a cascade-reservoir system in the Yangtze River of China, three operation models are compared and analyzed: the non-cooperative model, centralized model, and integrated game-theoretical model. The factors influencing the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model are also explored in this study. The results indicate that the system’s hydropower generation obtained by the integrated game-theoretical model is closer to the ideal solution obtained by the centralized model compared to that obtained by the non-cooperative model. Moreover, individual hydropower generation in non-cooperation (rational individual gains) is guaranteed by the integrated game-theoretical model, which is neglected by the centralized model. Furthermore, the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model is influenced by the water availability variation and regulation capacities of cascade reservoirs.

“…This leads to inevitable water-resource conflicts between the various administrative regions. The crucial problem of the international water-availability conflict is the lack of internationally-accepted allocation mechanisms for sharing water resources [6,7]. Concerning the allocation of internationally shared water resources, the central normative principle is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, which does not necessarily mean equal sharing of resources [8][9][10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Scenario-Based Framework for Conflict Resolution in Water Allocation in Transboundary Watersheds

Gorgoglione

Crisci

Kayser

et al. 2019

One of the main causes of water conflicts in transboundary watersheds all over the world is represented by the increasing water demand due to urban, industrial, and agricultural development. In this context, water scarcity plays a critical role since, during a drought period, water supply is not sufficient to cover the demand of all water uses. In this work, we have conceptualized and developed a new scenario-based framework able to improve the sustainability and equity of water allocation among two or more riparian countries. The proposed approach is in accordance with the United Nations Watercourses Convention. It considers a hydraulic/hydrologic model, a water-management model, and combines them with multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) and what if scenario analysis (WISA). The suggested framework was applied to the transboundary watershed of Cuareim/Quaraí river (Uruguay/Brazil) to tackle a real water-sharing conflict. It resulted in being very flexible in exploring various policy options and test and quantifying them with different scenarios to reach an objective and impartial decision in a water-sharing issue. This framework can effectively be applied to any other transboundary watershed to resolve any possible conflict related to water-allocation/water-management matter.