Watch This Space: Securing Satellite Communication through Resilient Transmitter Fingerprinting

Abstract

Due to an increase in the availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware, signal spoofing and replay attacks on satellite ground systems have become more accessible than ever. This is particularly a problem for legacy systems, many of which do not offer cryptographic security and cannot be patched to support novel security measures.Therefore, in this paper we explore radio transmitter fingerprinting in the context of satellite systems. We introduce the SatIQ system, proposing novel techniques for authenticating transmissions using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the downlinked radio signal. We look in particular at high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware, thus raising the required budget for spoofing and replay attacks. We also examine the difficulty of this approach with high levels of atmospheric noise and multipath scattering, and analyze potential solutions to this problem.We focus on the Iridium satellite constellation, for which we collected 1 705 202 messages at a sample rate of 25 MS/s. We use this data to train a fingerprinting model consisting of an autoencoder combined with a Siamese neural network, enabling the model to learn an efficient encoding of the message headers that preserves identifying information.We demonstrate the fingerprinting system's robustness under attack by replaying messages using a Software-Defined Radio, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.120, and ROC AUC of 0.946. Finally, we analyze its stability over time by introducing a time gap between training and testing data, and its extensibility by introducing new transmitters which have not been seen before. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are stable over time, can be used immediately with new transmitters without retraining, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay attacks by raising the required budget for attacks.

Adaptable Hardware Fingerprinting for Radio Data Links and Avionics Buses in Adversarial Settings

“…We are confident that the techniques proposed in this paper can be extended to other radio data link and bus systems. In fact, we have already successfully demonstrated a similar Siamese network based fingerprinting approach in a related context-fingerprinting satellite transmitters [9]. This adaptability had been an initial design goal and we are hopeful that others will also benefit from the platform.…”

Creating a Practical Education in Space Cybersecurity Through Antenna Design and Implementation

“…Since Stellarium has an application to select what satellites are passing through the area that would be the better fit, another area of research that needs to be expanded on in more detail for educational purposes is how easy it is to decode some of the intercepted signals. With some Iridium L Band satellites still transmitting, several security researchers have demonstrated how easy it is to break the encoding, which would be a great exercise for cybersecurity professionals [14][15][16]. Another area that needs more research is how higher-end software defined-radios would work in Western Kentucky since these software-defined-radios would have a better frequency range.…”

“…Another area that needs more research is how higher-end software defined-radios would work in Western Kentucky since these software-defined-radios would have a better frequency range. The SDR's hardware impacts the signal it receives, and newer hardware often allows for a better frequency range [14][15][16][17][18][19]. More research in these areas would help develop educational curricula in SDR configurations and have a strong baseline on what can be done in Western Kentucky.…”