Waste Package Performance Evaluations for the Proposed High‐Level Nuclear Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain

Mon, K.; Bullard, Bryan E.; Mehta, Sunil; Lee, Joon‐Hyung

doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00444.x

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…The assessments are continuing, including studies of HLW package performance (Mon et al 2004). The assessment must be tested against the yet to be released final EPA regulations.…”

Section: The Yucca Mountain Site and Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

High‐level radioactive waste management in the USA

Solomon

2009

Journal of Risk Research

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“…The assessments are continuing, including studies of HLW package performance (Mon et al 2004). The assessment must be tested against the yet to be released final EPA regulations.…”

Section: The Yucca Mountain Site and Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

High‐level radioactive waste management in the USA

Solomon

2009

Journal of Risk Research

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“…Alloy 22 was not susceptible to localized corrosion for most of the chemical conditions anticipated in the repository. ( 17,19–21 )…”

Section: Waste Characteristics and Disposal System Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(8,9,33) However, the material selected in the current package design is anticipated to contain waste throughout the initial 10 4 -yr regulatory period. (17,(19)(20)(21) The co-disposed package design consists of a 25-mm thick outer layer of Alloy 22 corrosionresistant material (20 mm for CSNF) and a 50-mm thick 316 stainless steel inner layer for structural strength (Fig. 3).…”

Section: Containersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A computer model, WAPDEG, which considers the current design specifications of the package, was constructed to simulate the time history of waste package perforation. (17,(19)(20)(21) For TSPA-SR, the parameters of the model varied over a range that was strongly biased toward conservative values (i.e., values that favored package failure). The results shows that >99% of the first waste package perforations occur after 2 × 10 4 yr (Fig.…”

Section: Containersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(12) As outlined in Section 2 of this article, we update our analysis in light of the current U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NRC guidance for screening features, events, and processes (FEPs). (13)(14)(15)(16) We respond to the NRC comment using the information on the repository and waste package failure (17)(18)(19)(20)(21)(22) summarized in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 6, we expand upon the reasoning behind the probability model of criticality based on the Oklo phenomena.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Improbability of Igneous Intrusion Promoting a Critical Event in Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposed in Unsaturated Tuff

Rechard¹,

Tierney²

2005

Risk Analysis

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In their regulations, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission permit the omission of features, events, or processes with probabilities of <10(-4) in 10(4) yr (e.g., a constant frequency of <10(-8) per yr) in assessments of the performance of radioactive waste disposal systems. Igneous intrusion (or "volcanism") of a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain for radioactive waste is one disruptive event that has a probability with a range of uncertainty that straddles this regulatory criterion and is considered directly in performance assessment calculations. A self-sustained nuclear chain reaction (or "criticality") is another potentially disruptive event to consider, although it was never found to be important when evaluating the efficacy of radioactive waste disposal since the early 1970s. The thesis of this article is that the consideration of the joint event--volcanism and criticality--occurring in any 10,000-year period following closure can be eliminated from performance calculations at Yucca Mountain. The probability of the joint event must be less than the fairly well-accepted but low probability of volcanism. Furthermore, volcanism does not "remove" or "fail" existing hydrologic or geochemical constraints at Yucca Mountain that tend to prevent concentration of fissile material. Prior to general corrosion failure of waste packages, the mean release of fissile mass caused by a low-probability, igneous intrusive event is so small that the probability of a critical event is remote, even for highly enriched spent nuclear fuel owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. After widespread failure of packages occurs, the probability of the joint event is less than the probability of criticality because of the very small influence of volcanism on the mean fissile mass release. Hence, volcanism plays an insignificant role in inducing criticality over any 10(4)-yr period. We also argue that the Oklo reactors serve as a natural analogue and provide a rough bound on probability of criticality given favorable hydrologic or geochemical conditions on the scale of the repository that is less than 0.10. Because the product of this bound with the probability of volcanism represents the probability of the joint event and the product is less than 10(-4) in 10(4) yr, consideration of the joint event can be eliminated from performance calculations.

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Review of the Modelling of Corrosion Processes and Lifetime Prediction for HLW/SF Containers—Part 2: Performance Assessment Models

King,

Kolàř,

Briggs

et al. 2024

CMD

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The disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SF) presents a unique challenge for the prediction of the long-term performance of corrodible structures since the HLW/SF canisters are expected, in some cases, to have lifetimes of one million years or longer. Various empirical and deterministic models have been developed over the past 45 years for making predictions of the long-term corrosion behaviour, including models for uniform and localized corrosion, environmentally assisted cracking and microbiologically influenced corrosion. As well as process models focused on specific corrosion mechanisms (described in Part 1 of this review), there is also a need for performance assessment models as part of the overall analysis of the safety of a deep geological repository (DGR). Performance assessment models are often based on simplified or abstracted process models. The manner in which various international waste management programs have predicted the long-term performance of HLW/SF containers with copper, steel, Ni and Ti alloy corrosion barriers is discussed. Performance assessments are repeated periodically during the development and implementation of a DGR, and the corrosion models are constantly updated in light of new mechanistic understanding and/or more information about the deep geological environment. Two examples of how the container performance assessment models evolve over time are also described. Performance assessment models cannot easily be validated, so it is important to build confidence in the long-term predictions using other methods, including natural analogues and large-scale in situ tests and the use of complementary models.

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Waste Package Performance Evaluations for the Proposed High‐Level Nuclear Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

High‐level radioactive waste management in the USA

High‐level radioactive waste management in the USA

Improbability of Igneous Intrusion Promoting a Critical Event in Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposed in Unsaturated Tuff

Review of the Modelling of Corrosion Processes and Lifetime Prediction for HLW/SF Containers—Part 2: Performance Assessment Models

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