Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?

Herzog, Bodo

doi:10.3790/vjh.73.3.405

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Herzog (, ,) argues that the second option, a rule‐based economic agenda based on a market approach, is an effective solution for EMU, not only on grounds of economic efficiency but also in light of Europeans’ reluctance to accept deeper European integration. For instance the German Constitutional Court judgments about the European Rescue Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the role of the German Parliament significantly.…”

Section: Literature Review and Assessment Of Emu's Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, the mechanism would relate a member state's political power (voting power) in the EcoFin Council to its fiscal performance in light of the rules and the fiscal compact. Such an intrinsic punishment in terms of sovereignty loss outweighs the current extrinsic incentives of monetary sanctions (Herzog ). It is the only mechanism which establishes a smart way for countries to internalise the costs of their policy decisions without an independent fiscal council.…”

Section: What's Next? Policy Prescriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

Herzog

Hengstermann

2013

Economic Affairs

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses new institutional rules for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). We propose a return to a strict and sustainable economic governance framework, which is mainly driven by market forces within a smart rule-based environment. Our recommendations are: (a) ex ante conditionalities with a tough monitoring process to avoid moral hazard in the future; (b) further enhancement of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (c) ultimo ratio punishment to be able to respond to the unique constellation of fiscal-monetary interaction and new rescue facilities. Countries violating fiscal rules for more than four years in a row will thus lose their fiscal sovereignty or will have to resign from the Eurozone. After fulfilling the ex ante conditionalities as well as all required criteria, the country either will recover its fiscal sovereignty, or, in case of exclusion, will be given the option to rejoin EMU under certain conditions. JEL codes: F33, F34, F36, H63, H81.

show abstract

Section: Literature Review and Assessment Of Emu's Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What's Next? Policy Prescriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

Herzog

Hengstermann

2013

Economic Affairs

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Fraglich ist weiterhin, wie geeignete Sanktionsmaßnahmen durchgesetzt werden können, wenn gleich mehrere Staaten (Barrett 2006) oder einzelne große Länder (Schelling 2002, 7) das Abkommen verletzen. Auch hier zeigen die Erfahrungen aus dem Stabilitäts-und Wachstumspakt, dass insbesondere große Länder geringere Anreize haben, sich vertragskonform zu verhalten (Herzog 2004).…”

Section: Die Antworten Der Umweltpolitik -Der Steinige Weg Von Der Th...unclassified

Internationalisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Baake¹,

Ohr²,

…³

2010

Schriften Des Vereins Für Socialpolitik

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

After acceding to the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are striving to become members of European Monetary Union (EMU). In order to do so, they must fulfil the Maastricht criteria. However, they must also meet the Copenhagen criteria of real convergence to be able to remain a part of EMU over the long term. These latter criteria relate, in particular, to labour mobility and wage flexibility. These measures of flexibility depend, in turn, upon the relevant institutional framework. An analysis, based on a neo-Keynesian labour-market model of labour-market institutions and social policies, such as employment protection legislation, wage-bargaining systems, active and passive labour-market policies and the financing of social security, in these countries, suggests that the resultant pressures for labour-market flexibility are still insufficient. * Der Verfasser dankt Renate Ohr und den Teilnehmern der Jahrestagung 2008 des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses für ihre Anregungen und konstruktive Kritik sowie Gabriele Somaggio für ihre Forschungsassistenz. Alle verbliebenen Fehler gehen selbstredend zu seinen Lasten.

show abstract

Makroökonomische Stabilisierung und „Beggar-Thy-Neighbour“-Verhalten am Beispiel der Finanzkrise

Bechmann¹,

Schwarz²

2011

Kredit und Kapital

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

Internationalisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Makroökonomische Stabilisierung und „Beggar-Thy-Neighbour“-Verhalten am Beispiel der Finanzkrise

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About