War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside

Münster, Johannes; Staal, Klaas

doi:10.1177/0738894210396629

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 43 publications

(67 reference statements)

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“…Most importantly, our paper is complementary to the work of Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) on misallocation of labor and caste networks of mutual insurance; here, the misallocation is across occupations rather than space, and the mechanism is different: rent-seeking does not appear in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016). Another literature considers conflict within and between groups, and our results effectively invert the logic found in Münster and Staal (2011), who find that groups have an incentive to fight with other groups to exhaust any desire to fight within-group; in our context, we find that an inability to “fight” with outsiders can intensify internal fighting, in the form of rent-seeking.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India

Lawson

Spears

2021

J. Dem. Econ.

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Three important features of Indian labor markets enduringly coexist: rent-seeking, occupational immobility, and caste. These facts are puzzling, given theories that predict static, equilibrium social inequality without conflict. Our model explains these facts as an equilibrium outcome. Some people switch caste-associated occupations for an easier source of rents, rather than for productivity. This undermines trust between castes and shuts down occupational mobility, which further encourages rent-seeking due to an inability of workers to sort into occupations. We motivate our contribution with novel stylized facts exploiting a unique survey question on casteism in India, which we show is associated with rent-seeking.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India

Lawson

Spears

2021

J. Dem. Econ.

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“…It is also possible that individual shares are defined by outcomes of an additional within-group conflict. Such nested or multi-level contests have also been studied [118,123,[127][128][129][130] with a general conclusion that external conflicts cause increasing within-group cooperation and reduced free-riding.…”

Section: (I) Homogeneous Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

113

133

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

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“…Yet, once one allows 3 to also join coalitions, it becomes clear that for the same reason only the grand coalition is subgame perfect. Still, as modeled by Münster and Staal (2011), when there is also an internal contest within coalitions, using endowments for external competition may actually lead to more production, as fewer resources are then left for harmful within-coalition competition.…”

Section: Rescuing the Initial Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common‐enemy Effects: Multidisciplinary Antecedents and Economic Perspectives

Jaegher

2020

Journal of Economic Surveys

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A disparate literature hypothesizes what can broadly be described as the common‐enemy effect: the fact that the interaction with a common enemy (formed by Nature, an individual, or a group) increases cooperation. This review identifies the multidisciplinary antecedents of this effect, and then distinguishes between several strands of literature applying noncooperative game theory to account for it. A first strand argues that the threat posed by a common enemy makes each player's cooperative effort more critical. In a second strand a behavioral common‐enemy effect caused by group interaction is studied experimentally. A third strand models the common‐enemy effect as the formation of a coalition of players against another player in a contest. A fourth strand formalizes the principle that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’, either in a model of social relations, interdependent altruistic preferences, or indirect reciprocity in repeated games. The connections between these strands of literature are investigated, and questions for future research are proposed.

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War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside

Cited by 17 publications

References 43 publications

Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India

Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Common‐enemy Effects: Multidisciplinary Antecedents and Economic Perspectives

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