War of the Future: A View from Russia

The Trump and Putin Doctrines: Evolving Great Power Tensions Between the United States and Russia

“… Justify increased military spending, and more central control of the military when no real threat exists (Blank 2019a : 6; Gouré 2019 : 68). Justify its military activity (hot and cold) in the shared-neighborhood (Chekov et al 2019 ; Schneider 2019 : 312–314). This includes the annexation of Crimea; Kremlin-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine; frozen conflicts in Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, and Moldova; constant saber-rattling (both in speech and in practice) against northern Europe and the Baltic States; Russian involvement in Syria.…”

“…This is Putin’s ability and inclination to use a total-war (hybrid warfare) approach to even the most limited conflict (Binnendijk and Gompert 2019 : 114–115). This could include conventional forces, nuclear forces, economic manipulation, information warfare (misinformation), saber-rattling, and even the cooptation of sub-state or non-state actors such as guerrilla, criminal, and terrorist organizations (Chekov et al 2019 ). Whereas the United States and most Western states have historically been more circumspect in their approach to different kinds of conflicts and different types of opponents, Russia’s most recent doctrine views every conflict (whether hot or not) as war, and does not exclude any response (Chekov et al 2019 ; Binnendijk and Gompert 2019 ; Schneider 2019 ).…”

“…This could include conventional forces, nuclear forces, economic manipulation, information warfare (misinformation), saber-rattling, and even the cooptation of sub-state or non-state actors such as guerrilla, criminal, and terrorist organizations (Chekov et al 2019 ). Whereas the United States and most Western states have historically been more circumspect in their approach to different kinds of conflicts and different types of opponents, Russia’s most recent doctrine views every conflict (whether hot or not) as war, and does not exclude any response (Chekov et al 2019 ; Binnendijk and Gompert 2019 ; Schneider 2019 ). For example, if NATO or the United States were to increase conventional force capacity in Poland or the Baltic States, even without making any sort of offensive, Putin could consider threatening, or even using, a nuclear (escalate to de-escalate) strike in response (Binnendijk and Gompert 2019 : 115).…”

“…Most concerning of all is that Putin already views Russia as at war with the United States (Blank 2019b : 6–7; Chekov et al 2019 : 30, 40). This does not mean that the United States has launched a traditional military offensive against Russia as, in fact, they have not.…”

“…Fifth, recognizing that Putin is willing to use force to achieve his Doctrinal outcomes, and further recognizing that wherever it happens Putin’s ultimate enemy will always be the United States (Chekov et al 2019 : 40), Trump needs to adopt a clear military response to any Russian offensive. It needs to send a clear message that the United States is ready and willing to respond forcefully to any forays against allies.…”