War as a Commitment Problem

Powell, Robert

doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061

Cited by 652 publications

(530 citation statements)

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“…The fundamental insight -the framing of the problem of war -remains the crucial contribution irrespective of whether we find that a particular cause he identified is not as robust as might have appeared initially (Leventoglu & Tarar, 2008). The insight has generated a lively literature on the causes of war, and has led to generalizations that show how the same basic commitment problem due to large rapid power shifts underpins explanations heretofore thought to be distinct (Powell, 2006).…”

Section: Making the Abstract Concretementioning

confidence: 81%

“…I have already given an example with the formal definition of rationality, but one can point to others. For instance, it was formalism that eventually led us to the realization that many seemingly disparate problems -instability produced by first-strike advantages, dynamic commitment problems, bargaining over things that influence future bargaining power, and even changing power relationships between domestic political factions -actually reduce to a simple mechanism that generates inefficiencies due to large rapid power shifts between the actors (Powell, 2006). Without the precise definition of the concepts in the existing models it is very doubtful that Powell would have realized that they all relied on a common mechanism.…”

Section: Telling Stories While Keeping Them Simplementioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies

Slantchev

2017

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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Section: Making the Abstract Concretementioning

confidence: 81%

Section: Telling Stories While Keeping Them Simplementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies

Slantchev

2017

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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“…23. Other beliefs beyond shifting power and commitment problems, such as the perception of benefits and costs of war (Berinsky 2007;Gelpi, Feaver, and Reier 2009) Fearon 1995;Powell 2006;Putnam 1988. responses to shifting power, it is important to explain how this connects to actors who have a direct impact on international relations and other conflict settings. I cover several connections: the public is a convenience sample of elites; the public can influence elite decisions; the public plays a core role in audience-cost theories that implicitly connect with shifting power explanations of conflict; and shifting power explanations of civil conflict directly involve members of the public.…”

Section: Research Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

Rising Power on the Mind

Tingley¹

2017

Int Org

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A prominent explanation of war claims that international conflict can result when shifts in bargaining power induce the declining power to behave aggressively today because the rising power cannot credibly commit to not behave aggressively tomorrow. This paper asks whether individuals respond to shifting power in ways assumed by these models. Rather than use abstract laboratory-based bargaining games as in other work, I use vignettes describing the United States in an international bargaining situation to explore the microfoundations of power transitions models empirically. The vignettes vary whether the individual is a member of a declining or a rising power and whether there are previous public commitments to the status quo division of territory. Subjects propose a response the United States should make and then explain their decision in their own words. I apply new methods for analyzing these openended responses. Consistent with predictions from the behavioral literature, I find important asymmetries in behavior across these conditions as well as substantial heterogeneities in individuals' motivations for their decisions. The results of the experiments suggest potential ways that power-transition models should be refined to have a firmer behavioral basis.A prominent explanation for why conflict occurs between countries is shifting power: states that are declining in power may act belligerently to prevent a decline and states that are increasing in power cannot credibly commit to not taking advantage of their new-found power in the future. A large literature has developed that describes why and how the dynamics of shifting power explain international conflict, ranging from power transition theory to formal accounts emphasizing commitment problems. 1 This literature largely adopts a "billiard ball" view of the state in which the influence of the public and domestic politics, as well as elite perceptions of both the internal and external environment, is bracketed. This approach contrasts with other literatures that have described mechanisms through which the public and domestic politics affect both international outcomes 2 and intrastate conflict. 3 This paper combines the theoretical and empirical motivations of both sets of literatures. It is the first to directly examine whether the public holds views that are My thanks to Nehmia Geva, Iain Johnston, Rose McDermott, Brian Rathburn, Jonathan Renshon, Molly Roberts, Robert Schub, Brandon Stewart, and Michael Tomz for illuminating conversations, participants in the TAMU IR workshop, and participants at the 2014 UCSD Behavioral International Relations conferences. I am especially grateful to Steph Haggard for multiple rounds of detailed comments.

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“…Fearon (1995) provides the canonical form of the bargaining model of war. Most initial work focused on informational asymmetries as the source of bargaining failure (Powell 1999, Chap. 3) but recently scholars have questioned its robustness (Leventoglu and Tarar 2008), and so the approach based on credible commitment problems (incomplete contracts) has become dominant (Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007;Powell 2006). The usual models in this vein assume either a fixed distribution of power or one that changes for exogenous reasons, making them unsuitable for studying questions of war finance.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms

Slantchev

2012

Am Polit Sci Rev

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War as a Commitment Problem

Cited by 652 publications

References 43 publications

On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies

On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies

Rising Power on the Mind

Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms

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